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ABSTRACT 
 
Jonathan Keeney: YOU CAN’T YELL “TIMBER!” IF YOU DON’T SEE THE FALLING 
TREE: HARNESSING CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY TO PROMOTE THE ETHICAL 
FRAMING OF SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
(Under the direction of David A. Hofmann) 
 
 
 
Harm is a fundamental ethical concern. Nonetheless, people often fail to see decisions 
that prevent harm as ethical choices, particularly when harmful outcomes are rare. Drawing on 
construal level theory, this dissertation proposes and tests a model of how the ethical 
implications of workplace decisions might be made more salient for workers, leading to more 
ethical choices. This investigation is undertaken in the context of workplace safety, in which 
harm prevention is paramount. Specifically, adopting an ethical decision frame (i.e., seeing 
safety-related decisions as ethical decisions) is predicted to increase safety performance 
(Hypothesis 1). Lower levels of construal will tend to promote ethical decision frame adoption 
(Hypothesis 2), particularly when an individual is high in other-orientation (Hypothesis 3). 
Combined, these predictions suggest a moderated-mediation model in which the indirect effect 
of construal level on safety performance via ethical decision framing is stronger at higher levels 
of other-orientation. These predictions are tested in three empirical studies—a quasi-experiment 
with offshore drilling industry workers (Study 1), a naturalistic, simulation-based laboratory 
study (Study 2), and a laboratory experiment (Study 3). The results of these studies are mixed, 
but taken together provide tentative support for the preceding hypotheses. Contributions, 
practical implications, and future directions are discussed.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Ethical concerns vary across people and cultures, but decades of research have 
established that perceptions of harm play a central role in ethical decision making (Kohlberg, 
1969; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983). Contemporary psychological theories broadly agree that harm 
is likely the most important, frequent, and universal ethical consideration (Haidt, Graham, & 
Ditto, 2015; Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014; Schein & Gray, 2017). 
When making a decision in which ethical considerations (e.g., harm prevention) are 
salient, an individual may adopt an ethical decision frame (i.e., conceptualize or categorize the 
decision as an ethical one; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Compared to other decision frames 
(e.g., business frames), ethical frames promote more ethical judgments and behaviors (e.g., 
Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013; Pillutla & Chen, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
1999). Related findings from investigations of moral awareness (e.g., Fleischman & Valentine, 
2003; Singhapakdi, 1999; Singhapakdi, Salyachivin, Viraku, & Veerayangkur, 2000; 
Singhapakdi, Vitell, & Franke, 1999; Singhapakdi, Vitell, & Kraft, 1996) and moral conviction 
(e.g., Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Skitka, 2002; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 
2002; Van Bavel, Packer, Haas, & Cunningham, 2012) provide further evidence that simply 
recognizing the ethical content of a decision can result in more ethical outcomes.  
In practice, however, people often fail to recognize the ethical implications of their 
decisions, particularly in organizational settings (e.g., Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005; 
Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Welsh, Ordóñez, Snyder, & Christian, 2014). Such failures are 
especially likely when it is uncertain, or unclear, whether harm will result from one’s actions. An 
 
 
2 
individual’s ability to recognize the ethical content of a decision depends upon the probability of 
effect (i.e., the perceived likelihood that a given action—or inaction—will result in harm; Jones, 
1991). Moreover, people have difficulty estimating probabilities accurately (Kahneman, Slovic, 
& Tversky, 1982). Cognitive errors, including the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973; Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991) and 
overconfidence bias (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Moore & Healy, 2008), lead to 
subjective probability estimates that understate the—already low—likelihood of rare, undesirable 
events (e.g., accidents). 
The preceding suggests a dilemma: The ethical framing of workplace decisions may 
promote ethical behavior, but ethical framing is determined by the degree and probability of 
potential harm at stake. How, then, can ethical framing be encouraged—without actually making 
accidents more harmful, or more likely? 
Construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010) provides a potential solution to 
this dilemma. Construal level theory proposes that individuals’ mindsets vary across contexts, 
from abstract and decontextualized (high level) to concrete and contextualized (low level). This 
distinction is often illustrated with the metaphor of “seeing the forest” versus “seeing the trees.” 
Differences in construal level determine psychological distance—the subjective perception of 
spatial, temporal, social, and hypothetical distance between the self and other objects (e.g., 
people, places, events; Trope & Liberman, 2010). A given object is perceived to be nearer at 
lower (vs. higher) levels of construal (Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006; Bar-Anan, 
Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007).  
Construal level influences subjective probability estimates, such that probabilistic 
outcomes appear more likely when viewed from a more concrete (i.e., lower level) mindset 
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(Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Harmful outcomes should therefore appear more likely to workers 
who adopt lower levels of construal, independent of actual base-rates. Individuals also perceive 
other people as closer, and more similar, to themselves at lower levels of construal (Stephan, 
Liberman, & Trope, 2009). Accordingly, workers who adopt lower levels of construal may 
experience a stronger sense of obligation to prevent others’ suffering (i.e., coworkers who might 
be injured if one behaves negligently; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Small & Simonsohn, 2008). 
Thus, promoting lower levels of construal among workers may increase their subjective 
perceptions of the degree and probability of harm at stake; thereby encouraging the ethical 
framing of workplace decisions without increasing actual risk.  
This application of construal level theory may be particularly relevant to the context of 
workplace safety. Workplace safety efforts involve a variety of employee behaviors, but are 
ultimately concerned with the prevention of harmful outcomes (i.e., accidents, injuries, fatalities; 
Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Neal & Griffin, 2006). 
The possibility of harm might lead employees to view safety-promoting behaviors (i.e., safety 
performance; Griffin & Neal, 2000) as ethical obligations. However, workplace accidents and 
injuries are generally low base-rate phenomena, and are unlikely to be caused by a single 
deviation from safety standards (Zohar, 2000). Thus, the ethical concerns raised by the context of 
workplace safety may be overlooked due to the rarity of harmful outcomes. 
One well-known tradition from the field of engineering is particularly illustrative. In 
1907, seventy-five workers were killed when the Quebec Bridge collapsed during construction, 
due to poor planning and decision making by the overseeing engineers. Soon after, in an effort to 
prevent future disasters, Canadian universities established the tradition of presenting new 
engineering graduates with the Iron Ring—a simple metal band to be worn throughout their 
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careers. The Iron Ring is intended to provide a “sharp reminder” of engineering ethics, and the 
obligation to prioritize safety. The tradition remains widespread today, and (apocryphal) legend 
holds that the rings are still forged from the steel of the ill-fated Quebec Bridge (Agapakis, 
2014). The Iron Ring is a subtle cue that invokes a specific accident, thereby encouraging 
engineers to adopt a more concrete mindset with respect to the potential implications of their 
work. 
With many safety performance behaviors, workers protect both themselves and others 
(e.g., coworkers). Motives for these behaviors may vary. Workers high in other-orientation—the 
propensity to be concerned for other people (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004)—will be more 
motivated by potential harm to others. This motivation should facilitate ethical framing (which is 
driven by perceived interpersonal harm; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012), particularly when those 
at risk are seen as closer, or more likely to be harmed (i.e., when viewed from a lower level of 
construal). Workers low in other-orientation (and, correspondingly, more self-interested; 
Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004, 2007) will instead be more motivated by potential harm to 
themselves, buffering the effect of construal level on the ethical framing of safety decisions.   
The preceding arguments can be integrated into a conditional indirect effect (i.e., moderated 
mediation; Edwards & Lambert, 2007) model, in which an indirect effect of construal level on 
safety performance via ethical framing is relatively strong at high levels of other-orientation, but 
attenuated or absent at low levels of other-orientation. 
 This current research makes several theoretical and practical contributions. This 
dissertation represents the first effort to directly integrate ethical decision making and workplace 
safety. Given the conceptual overlap between ethics and safety (due, in particular, to their shared 
focus on harm), the intersection of these literatures represents a potentially fruitful area for new 
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research. Illustrating this potential, the current research makes contributions to the workplace 
safety literature, by identifying construal level and, more proximally, ethical decision frames, as 
novel antecedents of safety performance. In doing so, it also responds to the calls of prominent 
ethics scholars to utilize more novel, organizationally-grounded dependent variables (Smith-
Crowe & Zheng, 2016; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008; Warren & Smith-Crowe, 2008), and 
to recognize the ethical content inherent—but understudied—in many organizational activities 
(Brief & Smith-Crowe, 2016).  
 Second, this dissertation contributes to an ongoing debate concerning the relationship 
between construal level and ethical decision making. While some investigations have found that 
higher levels of construal promote more ethical judgments and behavioral intentions (e.g., 
Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008; Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-
Benzoni, & Bazerman, 2007), others have produced seemingly contradictory results (e.g., Gong 
& Medin, 2012; Keeney & Hofmann, 2016). The current research provides new insight into this 
puzzle. Rather than proposing a connection between construal level and ethical decision making 
generally, this research focuses on a specific stage in the ethical decision making process (ethical 
decision frame adoption), and identifies a novel boundary condition of the construal level-ethical 
decision frame link (other-orientation). Additionally, this dissertation stresses the importance of 
context, focusing specifically on safety-related decisions, and identifying distinguishing features 
of this context (e.g., negative goals). Comparing these factors across studies—i.e., ethical 
decision making stage, boundary conditions, context—might help to reconcile prior work in this 
area. 
 Third, this dissertation identifies a novel antecedent, and boundary condition, for ethical 
decision frame adoption. Reviews of the ethical decision making literature have highlighted the 
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ethical decision frame construct as a valuable lens for clarifying processes of moral awareness 
(Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008) or moralization (Kreps & Monin, 2011), but empirical work 
involving ethical decision frames is limited. Prior research has identified only a few specific 
contextual antecedents of decision frame adoption, including sanctioning systems (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 1999, Study 3) and money salience (Kouchaki et al., 2013), while cognitive factors that 
shape individuals’ categorization of decisions have gone unaddressed. Moreover, prior 
investigations of decision frame adoption have been conducted almost exclusively in the 
laboratory; thus, this dissertation is among the first efforts to study the adoption of decision 
frames in more naturalistic settings. 
 Finally, in practical terms, this dissertation may provide guidance for simple 
interventions targeting a critical organizational outcome (i.e., safety performance). Prior research 
has shown that material symbols can have substantive effects in the ethical domain (Desai & 
Kouchaki, 2017), and the example of the Iron Ring illustrates how a small cue can make harm-
prevention more salient, bringing the ethical content of safety performance into focus. 
Experimental tests of construal level theory in prior work suggest that construal level-based 
interventions may be embedded in managerial communication, signage, safety materials, etc., 
and the current research illustrates the potential impact of doing so. Promoting lower levels of 
construal among employees, particularly at safety-critical times or locations, may potentially 
improve safety outcomes.  
 The remainder of this dissertation unfolds as follows. I first review relevant work from 
the extant workplace safety, ethical decision making, construal level theory, and other-
orientation literatures. These literatures are integrated to generate a set of novel hypotheses, 
resulting in the complete theoretical model depicted in Figure 1. I then report the method and 
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results of three empirical studies: a quasi-experimental survey study (Study 1), a multi-round 
simulation study (Study 2), and a laboratory experiment (Study 3). Lastly, I discuss the findings 
of this research, highlighting theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and future 
directions. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONTEXT OF SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
Construct Background 
 Safety performance is broadly defined as “the actions or behaviors that individuals 
exhibit in almost all jobs to promote the health and safety of workers, clients, the public, and the 
environment” (Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, & Smith-Crowe, 2002, p. 432). Thus, safety performance 
behaviors share the distal intention of preventing harm. 
 While the specific demands of workplace safety are highly context-dependent, safety 
researchers have advanced models of worker safety performance that can be applied across jobs 
and occupational fields. Burke and colleagues (2002) found support for a model consisting of 
four correlated factors: using personal protective equipment, engaging in work practices to 
reduce risk, communicating health and safety information, and exercising employee rights and 
responsibilities (i.e., pertaining to relevant safety laws and regulations). The instrument 
developed from this model (the General Safety-Performance Scale [GSS]; Burke et al., 2002) has 
been applied extensively in industry, and to evaluate the effectiveness of regional and national 
safety initiatives (e.g., Sarpy, Rabito, & Burke, 2015). However, this model has been applied 
only infrequently in the field of applied psychology (Hofmann, Burke, & Zohar, 2017). 
 Many organizational scholars have instead favored a more general two-factor model of 
safety performance, originally introduced by Andriessen (1978) with the labels of “carefulness” 
and “initiatives.” This model was later refined by Griffin and Neal (2000), following the broader 
distinction in organizational behavior between task performance and contextual performance 
(Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993). Safety compliance is 
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analogous to task performance, and involves adhering to safety rules and procedures, and 
completing work tasks in a safe manner. Safety participation is analogous to contextual 
performance, and encompasses helping coworkers, promoting workplace safety programs, 
demonstrating initiative, and putting effort into workplace safety improvement (Griffin & Neal, 
2000; Neal et al., 2000; Neal & Griffin, 2004). Evidence from meta-analyses suggests moderate 
to high correlations between these two facets (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006a). 
Still other investigations have highlighted behaviors that may not cleanly fit either model, 
yet seem to fall under the umbrella of safety performance, including: safety citizenship (i.e., 
discretionary behaviors focused on improving the safety performance of other team members and 
the organization more generally; Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003); and safety commitment 
(i.e., behaviors conveying an employee’s internalization of organizational values with respect to 
safety; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). 
In sum, the domain of safety performance encompasses a variety of behaviors; but, these 
behaviors are nonetheless modeled as correlated dimensions of a higher-order safety 
performance construct. Given the conceptual and empirical overlap between safety performance 
dimensions, and the shared focus of all safety performance behaviors on health and safety 
promotion (or, alternately stated, harm prevention), I focus on the broader construct of safety 
performance in the current research. 
Outcomes of Safety Performance  
 In keeping with a harm prevention-based definition of safety performance, the most-
commonly evaluated outcome of safety performance is the incidence of harmful events (i.e., 
accidents, injuries, or fatalities). Studies conducted in a variety of organizational settings provide 
compelling support for a negative relationship between safety performance and the occurrence of 
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accidents and injuries (e.g., Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; 
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Komaki, Barwick, & Scott, 1978; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; 
Neal & Griffin, 2006; Paul & Maiti, 2007; Probst, 2004; Probst & Brubaker, 2001; Wallace & 
Vodanovich, 2003; Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005).  
In one of the earliest examples of this research, Komaki and colleagues (1978) found that 
improved worker safety performance (following a “behavioral analysis” treatment) led to a 
decreased injury rate in two food manufacturing plants. Illustrating the other side of this effect, 
in a study conducted at a chemical processing plant, Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) found that 
unsafe employee behaviors were positively associated with actual accidents. A recent meta-
analysis of 90 primary studies found a moderate, negative effect of safety performance on 
accidents and injuries (Mρ = -.31), and no significant difference between the contributions of 
safety compliance and safety participation (Christian et al., 2009).  
 Safety performance is defined in terms of behavioral intentions, and the available 
evidence strongly indicates that safety performance behaviors are indeed effective in terms of 
preventing harm. This conclusion further illustrates both the conceptual overlap between safety 
and harm, and the practical importance of safety performance.   
Antecedents of Safety Performance 
 Workplace safety has been an active area of organizational scholarship for more than a 
century (for a review, see Hofmann et al., 2017). During that time, the primary focus of the 
workplace safety literature has been to identify factors that may promote, or discourage, safety 
performance and its more distal outcomes (i.e., accidents, injuries). 
Particular attention has been paid to organizational, or situational, antecedents of safety 
performance. Most notable among these is safety climate (i.e., “shared employee perceptions 
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about the relative importance of safe conduct in their occupational behavior;” Zohar, 1980, p. 
96). Numerous primary studies (for a review, see Zohar, 2014) and at least two meta-analyses 
(Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006a) have demonstrated that safety climate significantly 
predicts both safety performance behaviors and accidents. Other features of the organizational 
context that influence safety performance and related outcomes include: leadership (Barling et 
al., 2002; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann et al., 2003; Zohar 2002a; Zohar & Luria, 
2003), group processes (DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004; Frone, 1998; 
Hayes, Perander, Smecko, & Trask, 1998; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Siu, Phillips, & Leung, 
2003; Watson, Scott, Bishop, & Turnbeaugh, 2005), HRM practices (Dunbar, 1993; Goldenhar, 
Williams, & Swanson, 2003; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Krause, Seymour, & Sloat, 1999; Lingard, 
2002; Siu et al., 2003; Turner, Chmiel, & Walls, 2005; Zacharatos et al., 2005; Zohar, 2002b), 
communication (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998), organizational structure (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 
1990), and work pressure (Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000; Clarke, 2006b; DeJoy et al., 2004; 
Frone, 1998; Hayes et al., 1998; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Mearns et al., 2003; Prussia, Brown, 
& Willis, 2003; Siu et al., 2003; Turner et al., 2005)  
At the individual level of analysis, a useful distinction can be drawn between distal 
person-related antecedents of safety performance (i.e., relatively stable individual differences), 
and proximal person-related antecedents (i.e., relatively malleable psychological states more 
directly related to the context of safety; Christian et al., 2009). In terms of distal factors, studies 
have revealed mixed evidence for the role of personality in predicting safety outcomes. In 
particular, conscientiousness generally seems to promote safety performance (e.g., Griffin, 
Burley, & Neal, 2000; Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003), while neuroticism does so in some, but 
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not all, cases (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Paul & Maiti, 2007; but see Clarke & Robertson, 
2005). 
 Griffin and Neal (2000) identified two proximal person-related antecedents of safety 
performance: safety knowledge and safety motivation. Safety knowledge simply describes the 
extent of an individual’s safety-related knowledge (e.g., of emergency procedures, standards for 
personal protective equipment, etc.). Safety motivation is defined as “an individual’s willingness 
to exert effort to enact safety behaviors and the valence associated with those behaviors” (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006, p. 947). Models of worker safety performance (e.g., Christian et al., 2009; Griffin 
& Neal, 2000) typically conceptualize safety motivation as a mechanism through which features 
of the situation (e.g., safety climate) and more distal person (e.g., personality) influence safety 
performance. Several empirical studies provide support for these predictions (Griffin & Neal, 
2000; Maierhofer, Griffin, & Sheehan, 2000; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001; Neal & 
Griffin, 2006; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Probst & Brubaker, 2001; Varonen & Mattila, 2000; 
Zacharatos et al., 2005; Zohar & Luria, 2004). In a longitudinal study, Probst and Brubaker 
(2001) found that one situational factor (job security) and one personal factor (job satisfaction) 
predicted safety motivation which, in turn, had a positive lagged effect on safety compliance. 
Meta-analytic evidence indicates a moderate-sized effect of safety motivation on safety 
performance (including both safety compliance and participation dimensions; Christian et al., 
2009).  
 Understanding motivation is central to explaining behavior, because it clarifies the 
reasons that drive an individual’s actions (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003). Motivation, which refers 
generally to the psychological processes that direct, energize, and sustain action (Latham & 
Pinder, 2005), can derive from many different sources (e.g., Herzberg, 1966; Porter & Lawler, 
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1968; Staw, 1977). However, extant models provide an incomplete picture of the sources from 
which safety motivation derives. If safety motivation is predicted only by stable individual 
differences and features of the organizational context, little fluctuation should be observed within 
individuals. This suggests that employee safety motivation may only be influenced through 
relatively resource-intensive processes (e.g., personnel selection; job design). In contrast, other 
research suggests that an individual’s safety motivation (and, correspondingly, safety 
performance), may fluctuate a great deal. For example, healthcare workers’ adherence to hand 
hygiene standards declines over the course of a shift, and as a function of work intensity (Dai, 
Milkman, Hofmann, & Staats, 2015). This finding is consistent with the effects of fatigue and 
work demands on motivation more generally (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; 
Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). Simple interventions, including longer breaks between shifts (Dai 
et al., 2015) and changes to workplace signage (Grant & Hofmann, 2011) have been shown to 
improve safety performance, presumably without any accompanying change to more distal 
personal or organizational factors. 
 If the sources of safety motivation are not fully explicated, the reasons underlying safety 
motivation remain unclear as well. The survey items commonly used to operationalize safety 
motivation are face valid (e.g., “I feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times;” Neal et 
al., 2000), but shed little light on the components of this attitude, or how it might relate to other 
types of motivation. In particular, given that safety performance behaviors are intended to 
prevent harm, the possibility of overlap between safety motivation and motivation constructs 
within the ethical domain—including moral motivation (Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011; Rest, 
Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999) and prosocial motivation (Batson, 1987; Grant, 2007)—
merits investigation.  
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 In sum, existing models identify many important antecedents of safety performance, yet 
may remain incomplete. In particular, further exploration of the proximal psychological 
antecedents of safety performance offers a promising avenue for both theory development (i.e., 
due to the greater emphasis on the distal person in extant work) and practical application (i.e., 
because psychological states are generally more malleable than dispositional traits or features of 
the distal organization, and may therefore be influenced more easily through managerial 
intervention). This dissertation identifies and explores two factors (construal level and ethical 
decision frame adoption) that may be understood as proximal antecedents, or perhaps 
components, of safety motivation, and one factor (other-orientation) that may be interpreted as a 
boundary condition. 
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CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL DECISION FRAMES 
Safety Performance as a Decision 
 Safety performance, like all voluntary behavior, can be viewed as the outcome of a 
decision. Assuming complete safety knowledge (Griffin & Neal, 2000), an individual chooses—
at each opportunity for safety performance—whether or not to engage in the corresponding 
behavior. While safety performance behaviors are generally socially desirable, and often 
considered mandatory in organizations, an individual might nonetheless decide to deviate from 
safety standards, for a number of possible reasons. Organizational roles often involve conflicting 
or incompatible expectations (i.e., role conflict; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 
1964), or multiple goals which must be prioritized (Kernan & Lord, 1990; Locke, Smith, Erez, 
Chah, & Schaffer, 1994). Moreover, workers have finite motivational resources, which are often 
depleted by the physical, cognitive, and emotional demands of the workplace (Demerouti, 
Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). Under such 
conditions, the relative salience of goals or expectations often serves as a prioritization heuristic 
(e.g., Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). 
Most organizations value safety, but no organization exists for the sole purpose of 
avoiding accidents. Workers might therefore tend to view safety performance as a secondary 
goal, subordinate to task performance. As a result, safety performance behaviors (especially 
those perceived to be routine or insignificant; Hofmann & Frese, 2011) may appear to be less 
pressing or urgent than other behavioral expectations that are more clearly related to the 
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organization’s core productive activity, or more directly rewarded (Mento, Cartledge, & Locke, 
1980). Thus, safety motivation might lag behind task motivation. 
The motivational power of workplace goals is also affected by the perceived discrepancy 
between the current situation and the desired goal-state, with larger discrepancies motivating 
more goal-directed effort (Campion & Lord, 1982; but see Kernan & Lord, 1990). Safety is a 
negative goal, meaning it is defined in terms of the non-occurrence of some outcome (e.g., 
accidents; Dörner, 1989). Unless an accident is presently taking place, the more distal goal of 
safety performance (i.e., accident prevention) involves no discrepancy between the current and 
desired situations, which may limit the strength of safety motivation (relative to the motivation to 
achieve goals involving greater discrepancies). Thus, particularly in a context of competing 
expectations or goals, workers may decide not to enact safety performance behaviors.  
Construct Background 
Decision framing provides a useful conceptual lens for explaining when an individual 
may be more, or less, likely to prioritize safety performance. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) first 
defined a decision frame as “the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and 
contingencies associated with a particular choice” (p. 453), and proposed that the same decision 
may be approached in multiple ways—a departure from traditional, expected utility-based 
models of decision making. This insight inspired a variety of “naturalistic” decision making 
theories, which emphasize the context-dependence of decision making processes (e.g., Connolly 
& Koput, 1997; Klein, 1989; Noble, 1989; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). 
Building on this earlier work, March (1995) developed the logic of appropriateness 
theory, a rule-based model of decision making that makes two key assumptions. First, people are 
assumed to categorize decisions using situational cues (i.e., by answering the question, “What 
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type of situation is this?”). Second, individual differences (e.g., different social value 
orientations) lead to systematically different decisions. Rather than calculating and comparing 
expected utilities for various choices, March (1995) proposed that decision makers simply ask, 
“What does a person like me do in a situation like this?” According to this perspective, each 
individual maintains a set of decision frames, each providing rules for appropriate behavior for 
specific situations (March & Olsen, 2006). 
Signaling-processing theory (Messick, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) employs a 
similar logic, but stresses the importance of subtle situational cues in determining perceptions of 
appropriate behavior, applicable norms, what others can be expected to do, and what kinds of 
attributions can be made about others. Illustrating this insight, one study found that differences in 
the levels of cooperation observed in social dilemma and bargaining games were explained by 
the verbs used to describe the games to participants (e.g., “claiming” vs. “accepting;” Larrick & 
Blount, 1997).   
Thus, the decision frame, or type of decision an individual perceives, determines the 
“rules of the game” for decision making—including appropriate behaviors, salient norms, and 
expectations for others. Messick (1999) proposed that decision frames are particularly relevant 
for understanding how people approach decisions in situations that have an ethical “tinge.” 
Adopting an ethical decision frame, in which ethical considerations, norms, and rules of conduct 
are salient, should lead to more ethically defensible decisions and behaviors (e.g., prioritizing 
harm prevention, or fairness). Moreover, situational cues (e.g., the presence or absence of 
sanctioning systems; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; 2004) may play an especially critical role in 
determining what decision frame is adopted in ethically ambiguous settings. 
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 In this dissertation, I focus on the question of whether or not (or the extent to which) an 
individual adopts an ethical decision frame. Other decision frames which have been contrasted 
with ethical frames in prior research include: business decision frames, which are activated by 
money-related cues (Kouchaki et al., 2013), and in which norms of profit and self-interest guide 
decision making (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999); economic decision frames, in which “material 
or pecuniary ends” are the primary consideration (Pillutla & Chen, 1999, p. 84); and personal, 
legal, and environmental decision frames (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). In the sections that 
follow, I will first discuss why the context of safety performance might encourage the adoption 
of ethical decision frames, and then why it also might fail to do so. 
The Importance of Harm Perception 
 Research from the field of moral psychology offers insight into how and why people may 
adopt ethical decision frames. Rationalist models of moral judgment, based primarily on 
developmental evidence, dominated moral psychology throughout the twentieth century. 
According to the rationalist perspective, moral judgment is primarily the product of deliberative 
reasoning and reflection (Jones, 1991; Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1986). Breaking with this tradition, 
the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) argues instead for the primacy of moral intuitions, 
which are activated unconsciously by the presence of specific situational cues, or moral stimuli. 
Intuitive models propose that these moral intuitions drive moral judgments, while reasoning and 
reflection instead serve primarily to provide post hoc justification (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; 
Sonenshein, 2007). The intuitive perspective follows earlier work demonstrating the automaticity 
of social judgments more generally (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-
Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), and is supported by diverse 
 
 
19 
empirical evidence (e.g., Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011; Reynolds, Leavitt, & DeCelles, 2010; Schein & Gray, 2015). 
 The intuitive perspective is consistent with Messick’s (1999) emphasis on situational 
cues. But what cues are most likely to trigger moral intuitions, thereby leading to the adoption of 
an ethical decision frame? Evidence from several academic literatures suggests that perceived 
harm (or potential harm) may be uniquely important. 
Philosophers of ethics have long affirmed the central role of harm in questions of right 
and wrong (e.g., Betham 1970/1780; Hume, 1777; Mill, 1861; Singer, 1981). Evidence from 
developmental psychology (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983) shows that harm-related 
considerations are among the first elements of the “moral mind” to emerge in childhood, and that 
both children and adults use the presence of suffering as a heuristic to distinguish ethical 
violations from “conventional” violations (i.e., violations of social norms lacking ethical content; 
Huebner, Lee, & Hauser, 2010; Turiel, 1983). Harm prevention (i.e., protecting oneself and 
biological relatives) is thought to explain the evolution of morality (Haidt & Joseph, 2007; 
Hauser, 2006), and anthropological accounts reveal that harm-related violations are the most 
universally condemned across cultures (Mead, 1961; Mikhail, 2007; 2009; Shweder, 2012). 
 In moral psychology, debate persists over the number of intuitive moral stimuli (e.g., 
Graham, 2015; Gray & Keeney, 2015a; 2015b). Moral foundations theory (MFT; Graham et al., 
2013; Haidt, 2007) proposes that at least five distinct considerations may trigger moral 
judgments: harm, fairness, in-group loyalty, obedience to authority, and purity. In contrast, the 
theory of dyadic morality (TDM; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Schein & Gray, 2015; 2017) 
contends that all ethical considerations are ultimately reducible to the intuitive perception of 
harm. Whether it is the only moral stimulus or one of several, however, MFT and TDM agree 
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that perceived harm is a powerful driver of ethical decision making, and accounts for the most 
typical and universal of moral judgments (Haidt et al., 2015; Schein & Gray, 2017). 
 TDM also provides a detailed account of how perceived harm shapes ethical decision 
making (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). Moral judgment is 
theorized to be rooted in a cognitive template with three fundamental elements: (1) a suffering 
patient (i.e., victim); (2) an intentional agent; and (3) interpersonal harm (i.e., the agent’s action 
harming the patient). These elements are therefore the core situational cues that activate ethical 
decision making processes. Even if one of these cues is not readily apparent in a given situation, 
it may be automatically inferred from the others in a process known as dyadic completion (Gray 
et al., 2014). When observing a suffering victim, for example, people perceive wrongdoing by 
some responsible party. Thus, individuals are likely to judge their own actions (or inactions) as 
unethical to the extent that they perceive others who may be harmed. 
 In the context of safety-related decisions, then, there is substantial evidence to suggest 
that the possibility of harm (e.g., coworkers who may be injured in an accident) may encourage 
the adoption of an ethical decision frame. However, TDM also specifies that perceptions of harm 
are subjective (Gray et al., 2014). For example, political liberals and conservatives perceive 
different degrees of harm in anti-patriotic displays, religious blasphemy, and aberrant sex acts 
(Schein & Gray, 2015; cf. Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), and many research participants 
perceive harm even in scenarios that are carefully crafted to contain no objective harm (e.g., dog-
eating; Gray et al., 2014; cf. Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Of particular importance to the current 
research, perceptions of harm are sensitive to probability, and to characteristics or perceptions of 
the potential victim. Actions that are perceived as less likely to cause harm are also less likely to 
drive moral judgment (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Martin & Cushman, 2016). The 
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amount of harm perceived in a given scenario can also be influenced by factors such as the race 
(Hoffman, Trawalter, Axt, & Oliver, 2016) perceived deservingness (Weiner, 1993), and number 
of the victim(s) (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). 
Barriers to Ethical Decision Frame Adoption 
 By definition, safety performance decisions invoke a fundamental ethical concern (i.e., 
harm prevention). However, the subjective nature of harm perception suggests that workers will 
not necessarily categorize safety-related decisions as ethical decisions. Several lines of research 
suggest that organizational settings are particularly likely to obscure cues that might otherwise 
lead to the adoption of an ethical decision frame (Chugh et al., 2005; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
2004; Welsh et al., 2014). Taken together, this work suggests that even well-intentioned people 
often fail to recognize the ethical issues inherent in their workplace choices and behavior, even 
when such issues might appear obvious to observers. 
 The failure of individuals to recognize the ethical implications of their actions is often 
described in terms of bounded ethicality (Banaji & Bhaskar, 2000; Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 
2003; Chugh et al., 2005). Following Simon’s (1983) work on bounded rationality, the bounded 
ethicality perspective attempts to explain an apparent puzzle: many people who want to behave 
ethically, and to view themselves as ethical people, nonetheless engage in unethical behavior. 
Bounded ethicality has been empirically demonstrated in a variety of contexts, including: over-
claiming credit for group work (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006), harming future generations 
in intergenerational dilemmas (Wade-Benzoni, 1999; 2002; 2006), and giving in to corrupting 
conflicts of interest (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006). In contrast to rationalist 
theories of moral judgment, which tend to explain unethical behavior in terms of deficiencies of 
character or moral development (e.g., cognitive moral development; Kohlberg, 1969), the 
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bounded ethicality perspective aligns with intuitive theories, suggesting that people who fail to 
perceive ethical cues (e.g., potential harm) may be completely unaware of the unethical decisions 
they make (Chugh et al., 2005). 
 Ethical fading (Tenburnsel & Messick, 2004) offers a related perspective, and helps to 
explain how unethical decision making can escalate. Self-deception processes enable people to 
make unethical, or self-interested, decisions, while falsely believing that their behavior has 
upheld ethical principles. Decision makers might deceive themselves by overlooking potential 
victims, failing to recognize how their actions might cause harm, or denying their own agency or 
intentions. Over time, the ethical aspects of such decisions “fade” from view altogether, so that 
the ethical issues at stake are completed obscured. In a similar vein, research documenting the 
“slippery slope” of unethical behavior suggests that committing (or tolerating) small ethical 
infractions may, over time, cause people to commit progressively larger unethical acts, as their 
awareness of the wrongdoing is gradually eroded (Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Welsh et al., 2014).  
 These perspectives share an important insight: People often fail to recognize when they 
are making ethical decisions, and the organizational context makes such oversight particularly 
likely. This insight is also reflected in models of ethical decision making in organizations (e.g., 
Jones, 1991; Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008), in 
which ethical or moral awareness is presented as a necessary antecedent (e.g., “For the moral 
decision-making process to begin, a person must recognize the moral issues;” Jones, 1991, p. 
380).  
 In the context of safety performance, other cognitive errors may further inhibit workers’ 
ability to accurately perceive the harm that might result from non-performance, thereby reducing 
the likelihood of ethical decision frame adoption. Availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
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Schwarz et al., 1991) is a decision making heuristic in which the ease with which an event comes 
to mind serves as a cue for its likelihood. Workers who have not recently experienced or 
witnessed an accident, then, may discount the subjective probability of accident occurrence. 
Perceiving accidents as less likely may, in turn, cause workers to discount the importance of 
behaviors aimed at accident-avoidance (e.g., safety performance). Overconfidence bias 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Moore & Healy, 2008) leads people to underestimate their own 
fallibility, and overestimate their invulnerability from negative outcomes (e.g., harm). A worker 
with an accurate overall perception of accident base-rates might still discount the likelihood of 
such accidents occurring as a result of his or her own decisions, decreasing the likelihood that 
such decision will be viewed through an ethical frame. 
The preceding review provides mixed evidence concerning whether ethical decision 
frames might automatically be adopted in the context of safety performance. The distal goal of 
safety performance (harm prevention) is also the situational cue that most reliably activates 
ethical decision making processes. However, decision makers in organizations are only 
boundedly rational and ethical, and are often distracted by competing expectations. As a result, 
they may overlook such cues. 
Effects of Ethical Decision Frames 
 In contrast, the available evidence concerning consequences of ethical decision frame 
adoption is fairly consistent. While several review papers have highlighted the theoretical value 
of the ethical decision frame construct (Kreps & Monin, 2011; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; 
Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008), few empirical investigations to date have tested the effects of 
ethical decision frames directly. In one exception, a scenario-based experiment involving 
pollution decisions in a manufacturing setting, participants who adopted an ethical decision 
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frame were more likely to invest in pollution controls than those who adopted a business 
decision frame (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999, Study 3). Other findings indicate that “non-
ethical” decision frames—including business, economic, and instrumental frames—lead to less 
ethical outcomes, including: deception of fellow participants in laboratory studies (Kouchaki et 
al., 2013, Study 3), more competitive (vs. cooperative) behavior in social dilemma games 
(Pillutla & Chen, 1999), and less disciplining of followers’ ethical transgressions by leaders 
(Desmet, Hoogervorst, & Van Dijke, 2015). These findings are reinforced by other evidence 
suggesting that exposure to business environments or strategies promotes unethical and selfish 
behavior (e.g., Bennett, Pierce, Snyder, & Toffell, 2013; Malhotra & Gino, 2011). 
 Despite the paucity of studies examining ethical decision frames specifically, several 
closely related constructs have been investigated more extensively. Moral awareness refers to a 
decision maker’s awareness, or recognition, that a given decision involves ethical considerations 
(Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Moral awareness is either explicitly included (Hunt & 
Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991; Rest, 1986), or implied (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Treviño, 1986), in 
several foundational models of ethical decision making in organizations. These theories suggest 
that moral awareness is a necessary condition for ethical decision making and behavior—if 
decision makers are not morally aware, their decision making process cannot be described as 
ethical. While this account is derived from the rationalist tradition, it is equally compatible with 
an intuitive perspective, in which moral awareness results from the unconscious recognition of 
moral stimuli (e.g., Haidt, 2001). It is also supported by more recent evidence documenting 
bounded ethicality (Chugh et al., 2005) and ethical fading (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), which 
suggests that much of the unethical decision making observed in organizations results from 
ethical unawareness. 
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  Several empirical studies have directly tested the effects of moral awareness on ethical 
judgments and intentions. These findings generally support positive effects of moral awareness 
on ethical judgment (e.g., Fleischman & Valentine, 2003; Singhapakdi et al., 1996; but see 
Valentine & Fleischman, 2003) and, more consistently, on ethical intentions (e.g., Singhapakdi, 
1999; Singhapakdi et al., 2000; Singhapakdi et al., 1999). In one study of marketing industry 
professionals, Singhapakdi and colleagues (1996) found that moral awareness significantly 
predicted respondents’ judgments that wrongdoing had occurred in a series of ambiguous, 
industry-specific, vignettes. 
In their review of the ethical decision making literature, Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 
(2008) proposed an integration of moral awareness with ethical and non-ethical decisions frames. 
Decision makers who adopt an ethical decision frame are morally aware—these concepts are 
effectively synonymous. Decision makers who adopt non-ethical decision frames are morally 
unaware—and here the two constructs may be more meaningfully distinguished. Moral 
unawareness that stems, for example, from the adoption of a business decision frame may differ 
substantively from moral unawareness stemming from the adoption of a personal decision frame. 
Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) also argued that, while moral awareness may be necessary 
for ethical decision making, it is not sufficient. This logic suggests that moral awareness (or 
ethical decision frame adoption) increases the likelihood that a decision maker will make an 
ethical choice, but does not guarantee this outcome. 
Evidence from moral psychology, particularly involving the constructs of moral 
conviction and moralization, may also speak to the possible effects of ethical decision frames. 
Moral philosophers (e.g., Boyd, 1988; McDowell, 1979; Moore, 1903; Sturgeon, 1985) and 
psychologists (e.g., Turiel, 1983) argue that moral considerations are of a unique, special class, 
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qualitatively distinct from “conventional” considerations, and may accordingly have different 
motivational and behavioral effects. Moral conviction refers to an individual’s subjective belief 
that something is fundamentally right or wrong (Skitka, 2002). An individual who views an issue 
in terms of moral convictions is said to moralize the issue (Rozin, 1999). Attitudes held with 
strong moral conviction may be referred to as moral mandates (Sitka et al., 2005). 
Compared to other strong attitudes (i.e., perceived in terms of “desirable vs. undesirable,” 
rather than “right vs. wrong”), moral mandates lead to deeper commitment, and stronger 
emotional (Haidt, 2001; Shweder, 2012) and behavioral (Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 
2002) responses. For example, Skitka and colleagues (2005) found that stronger moral 
conviction led to increased intolerance, reduced cooperativeness, and greater inability to resolve 
disagreements in interactions between individuals holding dissimilar attitudes. Related work 
suggests that people often hold morally-laden “sacred values” (e.g., honor, justice, life), and 
vehemently condemn decisions and behaviors that involve tradeoffs between these values and 
more “profane” outcomes (e.g., placing a price on human life; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, 
Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). 
Applied to the context of safety-related decision making, these findings suggest that, if a 
worker perceives a given decision in terms of moral right and wrong (i.e., adopts an ethical 
decision frame), he or she will be particularly committed to the right (i.e., safety-promoting) 
choice. This may result in reduced flexibility with regard to safety standards and, importantly, 
less willingness to tradeoff safety performance against other, more “profane,” behavioral 
standards (e.g., task performance) when role conflict arises. In a non-moral decision frame (e.g., 
a business frame), a worker might be more willing to subordinate safety performance to task-
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related demands, so long as the latter more directly relates to the organization’s profitability, or 
to the worker’s own rewards. 
 Moralization is often the result of group- or societal-level processes that unfold over long 
spans of time (Rozin, 1999; Shweder, 2012). However, the social intuitionist perspective (Haidt, 
2001) suggests that, at the individual level, moral conviction can also emerge rapidly and 
automatically, in response to specific situational cues (i.e., moral stimuli). Evidence for a series 
of studies by Van Bavel and colleagues (2012) supports this interpretation. Participants evaluated 
a set of actions in either moral (i.e., morally good vs. bad) or non-moral (i.e., pragmatically good 
vs. bad) terms. Participants’ moral evaluations were faster, more extreme, and more strongly 
associated with universal prescriptions than non-moral evaluations of the same action—findings 
all indicative of greater moral conviction (Skitka et al., 2005). Thus, the moralization of a given 
action is not necessarily the result of attitudes an individual has held over a long period of time, 
or received from the culture to which he or she belongs. Moralization can also occur almost 
instantaneously, in response to subtle situational cues. 
 To summarize, while few direct tests of ethical decision frame effects have been 
conducted to date, the organizational literature on ethical awareness, and psychological literature 
on moral conviction and moralization, both provide substantial evidence to suggest that the 
adoption of an ethical decision frame will lead to more ethical choices and behaviors. In the 
context of safety-related decisions, I have proposed that a worker adopts an ethical decision 
frame when he or she recognizes that the decision is an ethical one (i.e., involves the ethical 
consideration of harm prevention). However, this phenomenon might also be reasonably  
interpreted in terms of ethical awareness, or moralization, of workplace safety. Based on these  
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sources of evidence, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 1. In the context of safety-related decisions, adoption of an ethical decision 
frame will lead to increased safety performance. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY 
 My review of the literature to this point suggests that ethical decision frame adoption 
offers a potentially effective means of increasing safety performance but, for a variety of reasons, 
workers may overlook the ethical content of safety performance. I next turn to the literature on 
construal level theory, which offers a potential solution to this dilemma. 
Theoretical Background 
 Construal level theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010) provides a conceptual 
model detailing how context shapes cognition, judgment, and behavior. CLT’s origins can be 
traced to earlier theories of categorization (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978), concept formation (Medin & 
Smith, 1984), and action identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; 1989). The overarching 
insight of CLT is that the mindset, or mental representation, through which an individual 
conceptualizes a given target (e.g., an object, person, event, or action) varies along a continuum 
of abstraction. At higher (i.e., more abstract) levels of construal, objects are perceived in terms of 
broad or primary features, people are perceived in terms of dispositional traits and group 
membership, events are perceived in terms of causes, and actions are perceived in terms of 
desirability and underlying goals (why the action is performed). At lower (i.e., more concrete) 
levels of construal, in contrast, objects are perceived in terms of details and secondary features, 
people are perceived in terms of individuating characteristics and contextually-determined 
behaviors, events are perceived in terms of effects, and actions are perceived in terms of 
feasibility and situational considerations (how the action is performed; Liberman & Trope, 
1998). 
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 To illustrate this distinction, consider a researcher deciding whether to attend a particular 
conference. In a higher-level construal mindset, the researcher might focus on the value assigned 
to his or her superordinate goals for attending (e.g., learning new things; networking with 
colleagues). In a lower-level construal mindset, the researcher might instead focus on the 
logistical challenges inherent in attending (e.g., making travel plans; rescheduling other 
commitments). Upon arrival at the conference, the researcher might conceptualize the action of 
attending a presentation as “acquiring new knowledge” (higher-level construal), or “sitting in a 
chair and taking notes” (lower-level construal).  
Construal level is highly variable, both between individuals (i.e., different researchers 
might conceptualize attending the same conference at different levels of abstraction), and within 
individuals (i.e., the same researcher might conceptualize two different conferences at different 
levels of abstraction, or might conceptualize the same conference at different levels of 
abstraction at different points in time; Liberman & Trope, 2014).  
Literature Review 
 Early research in this tradition drew on temporal construal theory—which holds that 
people conceptualize the distant future in more abstract, high-level terms than the near future—to 
better understand how people make plans and choices pertaining to the future. Temporal 
construal theory was applied to help explain intertemporal choices (Ainslie, 1975; Thaler, 1981; 
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992), delayed gratification (Mischel, 1974), the planning fallacy 
(Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993), and prediction psychology (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
 Building on this work, Trope and Liberman (2003) proposed that, by adopting a higher-
level mindset, people are able to traverse psychological distance—or mentally “time travel”—in 
order to perceive temporally distant events (i.e., those occurring in the distant future or past). 
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Subsequent research moved beyond temporal construal to identify other instances in which high-
level construal facilitates the traversing of psychological distance, such as when an object or 
event is far away in space or geography (spatial distance; e.g., Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & 
Liberman, 2006), happens to others (social distance; e.g., Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & 
Trope, 2008), or seems unlikely to occur (hypothetical distance; e.g., Liberman & Förster, 2009).  
These insights were integrated into the broader construal level theory of psychological 
distance (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010). According to CLT, an increase in any of the four 
psychological distances (temporal, spatial, social, and hypothetical) results in a higher level of 
construal. These distances are inferred from one another and therefore interrelated, such that an 
increase (or decrease) in one distance leads to a corresponding change in the others (Liberman & 
Trope, 2014). In one study, for example, landscape photographs conveying a sense of spatial 
nearness (vs. distance), increased the relative accessibility of words related to temporal nearness 
(e.g., “tomorrow” vs. “next year;” Bar-Anan et al., 2007). Additionally, the relationship between 
construal level and psychological distance is itself reciprocal, such that greater psychological 
distances are inferred in higher-level construal mindsets, and vice-versa (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; 
Trope & Liberman, 2010). Dozens of psychological experiments have provided support for these 
predictions, utilizing a variety of designs and stimuli (for reviews, see Liberman & Trope, 2008; 
2014; Trope & Liberman, 2003; 2010).        
 In recent years, CLT has increasingly been applied in organizational research, because it 
provides a well-validated conceptual framework for understanding organizationally-relevant 
differences in mindset. For example: strategy (higher-level construal) vs. tactics (lower-level 
construal); or vision (higher-level construal) vs. execution (lower-level construal; Reyt, 
Wiesenfeld, & Trope, 2016; for a review, see Wiesenfeld, Reyt, Brockner, & Trope, 2017). In 
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the organizational behavior literature, applications of CLT have shed new light on a variety of 
topics, including: workplace incivility (Rosen, Koopman, Gabriel, & Johnson, 2016), 
organizational justice (Brockner, Wiesenfeld, Siegel, Bobocel, & Liu, 2015; Cojuharenco, 
Patient, & Bashshur, 2011; Mentovich, Yudkin, Tyler, & Trope, 2016; Rizvi & Bobcel, 2015), 
organizational learning and innovation (Reyt & Wiesenfeld, 2015), communication (Joshi & 
Wakslak, 2014; Joshi, Wakslak, Raj, & Trope, 2016), leadership (Berson & Halevy, 2014; 
Berson, Halevy, Shamir, & Erez, 2015), advice taking (Reyt, Wiesenfeld, & Trope, 2016), 
negotiation (De Dreu, Giacomantonio, Shalvi, & Sligte, 2009; Henderson & Trope, 2009), and 
power (Joshi & Fast, 2013; Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012).   
Construal Level, Ethical Decision Making, and Safety Performance 
 Turning to the literature on construal level in the contexts of decision making and self-
regulation, the current balance of evidence seems to suggest that higher levels of construal will 
lead to more desirable outcomes. Higher levels of construal have been shown to increase self-
control, in contexts ranging from delaying the gratification of a tasty dessert (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989), to persisting in holding onto a handgrip in 
the laboratory (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006), to maintaining a polite demeanor 
after experiencing incivility in the workplace (Rosen et al., 2016). In resource allocation 
decisions, participants assigned to a high-level (vs. low-level) construal condition were more 
likely to make decisions that maximized collective outcomes (Stillman, Fujita, & Sheldon, 
2016). Survey respondents reported behavioral intentions more congruent with their own core 
values when primed to focus on the distant (vs. near) future (Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, 
& Chaiken, 2009). Similarly, in studies of “want vs. should” conflicts, more psychologically near 
events were shown to activate “want” motivations, focused on the decision maker’s immediate 
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self-interest, while more psychologically distant events instead tended to activate “should” 
motivations, focused on the decision maker’s long-term interests and values (Milkman, Rogers, 
& Bazerman, 2008; Rogers & Bazerman, 2008). 
 Several studies have produced similar results for decision making in the ethical domain. 
In scenario-based studies, research participants judged others’ unethical behaviors more harshly 
when those behaviors were imagined from a more psychologically distant (vs. near) perspective 
(Eyal et al., 2008; Yan & Lou 2013). Participants also reported greater willingness to engage in 
prosocial behaviors (e.g., volunteering to help a student in need) when those behaviors were 
described as taking place in the distant (vs. near) future (Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Eyal et 
al., 2009). More generally, Tenbrunsel and colleagues (2010) argued that lower levels of 
construal, by making immediate needs salient, may reduce decision makers’ sensitivity to more 
abstract ethical considerations.  
 This evidence might seem to suggest that higher levels of construal will also promote 
ethical decision making processes (i.e., ethical frame adoption), and desirable behaviors (i.e., 
safety performance) in the context of workplace safety. However, the generalizability of these 
findings may be limited by two distinguishing features of safety-related decisions. First, safety is 
a negative goal (i.e., defined in terms of the non-occurrence of some event, such as an accident; 
Dörner, 1989). Second, as argued above, the ethical content of safety performance decisions will 
be detected intuitively (i.e., by perceiving potential harm), rather than by deliberatively applying 
ethical principles. Prior work suggests that higher levels of construal facilitate behavior that 
promotes future goals (e.g., delaying gratification; favoring “should” over “want”), or abstract 
commitments (e.g., core values; broad ethical principles). But, are these findings applicable to 
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behaviors that instead involve preventing undesirable outcomes, or responding to specific, 
situationally-embedded cues? 
 According to the compatibility principle (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), attitudes (and other 
forms of cognition) predict behaviors to the extent that an attitude and behavior are at 
comparable levels of specificity. Recent work has applied this logic directly to CLT, introducing 
the concept of construal fit (Berson & Halevy, 2014; Berson, Halevy, Shamir, & Erez, 2015). 
One illustration of this phenomenon found that, when the hierarchial difference (i.e., social 
distance) between leaders and followers is relatively large, followers are more motivated by 
more abstract (i.e., higher-level construal) leader communication. When the hiearachical 
difference is small, in contrast, more concrete leader communication elicits more positive 
follower reactions (Berson & Halevy, 2014). Construal fit is evident when abstract mindsets (i.e., 
higher levels of construal) predict behavioral intentions for the distant future (e.g., Eyal et al., 
2009), or actions that correspond to broad, decontextualized goals (e.g., core values or ethical 
principles; Eyal et al., 2008). On the other hand, such mindsets may exhibit misfit with behaviors 
that: occur in the immediate or near future; are initiated by situation-specific cues; or focus on 
maintaining the status quo and preventing negative events (vs. promoting desired future states).  
 Incompatibility, or construal misfit, may help to explain an apparent puzzle in safety-
related decision making: safety perfromance invokes—by definition—a fundamental ethical 
concern (i.e., harm), yet people do not always perceive safety-related decisions as ethical 
decisions. Safety performance behaviors are ultimately concerned with the prevention of rare 
outcomes (i.e., accidents; Zohar, 2000). Cognitive errors such as the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and overconfidence bias (Lichtenstein et al., 1982) may result in 
those outcomes being perceived as rarer still. In the language of CLT, then, accidents are 
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hypothetically distant. Given the robust, reciprocal, relationship between construal level and 
psychological distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010), safety-related decisions should therefore tend 
to evoke higher levels of construal. Because psychological distances are interrelated (Liberman 
& Trope, 2014), the hypothetical distance (i.e., rarity) of accidents should correspond to 
perceptions of related spatial, temporal, and social distances as well. This may help to explain the 
tendency of workers in safety-critical settings to perceive accidents as “something that happens 
to other people in other places” (Dörner, 1989). 
 However, several lines of argument indicate that lower levels of construal (and 
psychological distance) might be much more conducive to ethical decision frame adoption. 
Given that harm perceptions are sensitive to probability (Malle et al., 2014; Martin & Cushman, 
2016), safety-related decisions will be more likely to trigger decision makers’ ethical intuitions 
when accidents appear more likely to occur. Additionally, in order for potential harm to be 
perceived as an ethical concern, one must care about the person(s) suffering that harm (i.e., via 
empathy; Baron-Cohen, 2011; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Research on the identifiable victim 
effect (Small & Loewenstein, 2003) points to a direct link between construal level and caring—
people care more for suffering others whom they perceive more concretely (i.e., with more 
personalizing information). Similarly, many studies have shown that people experience more 
empathy toward others to whom they feel more psychologically close, and are more likely to 
prevent or alleviate close others’ suffering (e.g., Kanekar, Pinto, & Nazareth, 1990; Rachlin & 
Jones, 2008; Small & Simonsohn, 2008; Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, & Dale, 2010; Williams & 
Bargh, 2008). 
 In sum, I am arguing that decision makers adopt ethical frames in response to specific, 
situational cues common to safety-related decisions (i.e., perceptions of potential harm). 
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Increasing the salience of those cues should therefore promote ethical decision frame adoption. 
Relatedly, some scholars have argued that lower levels of construal have more power to 
influence judgment and decision making in general, because the more concrete and detailed 
information available in such mindsets is more salient and “imageable” (Gong & Medin, 2012; 
Semin & Fiedler, 1988). One recent investigation lends support for this argument in the context 
of workplace safety (Burke, Salvador, Smith-Crowe, Chan-Serafin, Smith, & Sonesh, 2011). In a 
meta-analytic review of safety training effects, Burke and colleagues (2011) found evidence of a 
“dread factor.” More engaging safety training (i.e., involving behavioral modeling, simulation, or 
computer-interface instruction; as opposed to lectures or written materials) increased safety 
performance by making adverse outcomes more salient, particularly when the potential harm 
associated with those outcomes was severe (e.g., serious injury, illness, or death).  Findings from 
the CLT literature indicate that words (written or spoken) lead to higher-level construal of their 
subject than pictures or other representations that bear some visual or physical resemblence to 
the subject (Amit, Algom, & Trope, 2009; Amit, Algom, Trope, & Liberman, 2008). Thus, the 
“dread factor” can be interpreted as evidence that lower levels of construal (as activated by more 
visual or embodied safety training) increase the salience of potential harm and, at least when the 
severity of that potential harm is high, lead to increased safety performance. 
 In sum, workers are likely to view safety-related decisions from a relatively high level of 
construal by default, due to the rarity of accidents and injuries in most organizational settings. 
However, this tendency will give rise to construal level misfit with respect to ethical decision 
frame adoption, because higher levels of construal decrease the level and salience of perceived 
harm. Interventions to lower workers’ level of construal might therefore increase the likelihood 
that they will perceive safety-related decisions as ethical decisions.   
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Several empirical findings are broadly consistent with this prediction. Regulatory focus 
theory (Higgins, 1997) argues that, when pursuing goals, people may focus more heavily on 
promoting positive outcomes (promotion focus), or preventing negative outcomes (prevention 
focus; Higgins, 1996; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). The ethical concerns raised by 
safety-related decisions (i.e., preventing potential harm) are consistent with a prevention focus. 
In one set of experimental studies, Pennington and Roese (2003) found that lower levels of 
construal (manipulated via psychological distance) increased participants’ consideration of 
prevention-focused considerations. Correspondingly, prevention focus leads to risk avoidance, 
and to reduced rates of unethical behavior (Gino & Margolis, 2011).  
A few studies provide direct support for a negative effect of construal level on ethical 
decision making (i.e., lower levels of construal leading to more ethical decision making) in 
relevant decision contexts. Noting that Eyal and colleagues (2008) manipulated construal level 
indirectly via temporal distance (scenarios described unethical behaviors occurring in either the 
near or distant future), Gong and Medin (2012) attempted to replicate their work by instead 
manipulating construal level directly, with all behaviors described as occurring in the present. 
Across four studies, lower levels of construal were instead associated with greater moral outrage 
toward others’ unethical behavior. These findings are consistent with the compatibility-based 
argument that, all else equal, lower levels of construal provide better “fit” for outcomes that 
pertain to the here and now. Lastly, in a cross-sectional study of airport workers, Keeney and 
Hofmann (2016) found a significant, negative correlation between workers’ construal of safety 
(coded from open-ended essays), and the extent to which they perceived ethical considerations to  
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be involved in various safety behaviors. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2. In the context of safety-related decisions, lower levels of construal will 
increase the likelihood (or extent) of ethical decision frame adoption. 
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CHAPTER 5: OTHER-ORIENTATION VS. SELF-INTEREST 
Construct Background 
 The hypothesized link between construal level and the ethical framing of safety-related 
decisions is rooted in the perception of potential harm, which should appear more probable and 
salient at lower levels of construal. To this point, I have focused on perceptions of interpersonal, 
or other-oriented, harm. “Interpersonal” is defined broadly here to include coworkers, customers, 
and other stakeholders—any individual other than the decision maker him- or herself. However, 
many safety-related decisions also involve the potential for personal harm (i.e., harm to the self). 
 While all safety performance behaviors are intended to prevent harm, the potential for 
other-oriented harm prevention may be more apparent for certain behaviors, while personal harm 
prevention is more apparent for others. In Burke and colleagues’ (2002) framework, for example, 
use of personal protective equipment might be more readily associated with personal harm 
prevention; communicating health and safety information (e.g., “Engages in the appropriate 
methods to notify workers, supervisors, and/or emergency coordinators of emergency 
conditions”) might be more readily associated with other-oriented harm perception; and 
engaging in work practices to reduce risk (e.g., “Properly disposes of materials and/or equipment 
that pose a health risk”) might balance these considerations. 
 Safety climate research (e.g., Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996, 1998; Zohar, 1980, 2000) 
suggests a somewhat different perspective: All safety performance behaviors can be seen as 
preventing other-oriented harm, because they contribute to the shared perception that safe 
performance is expected, rewarded, and valued in the organization or group. For example, 
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workers who use the appropriate personal protective equipment for a task are not only protecting 
themselves, but also other employees (e.g., newcomers) for whom they are modeling safe 
behavior. On the other hand, it may also be possible to view most—if not all—safety 
performance behaviors in terms of personal harm prevention. The importance of self-interest as a 
driver of human behavior, and organizational behavior more specifically, has been demonstrated 
across an incredibly wide range of contexts (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2005; Miller, 
1999; Rocha & Ghoshal, 2006). Even for safety performance behaviors that ostensibly pertain to 
other-oriented harm (e.g., communicating potential safety hazards to others), a decision maker 
might focus instead on the possibility of personal harm (e.g., loss of professional or social 
standing; reciprocated non-performance by coworkers). 
 In short, a decision maker’s construal level should predict the amount of harm perceived, 
but the extent to which harm perceptions are other-oriented (or personal) may independently 
vary. Experiencing more other-oriented harm perceptions indicates higher levels of other-
orientation, a more general construct referring to an individual’s propensity to be concerned for 
other people (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004). Like self-interest, other-orientation helps to explain 
a variety of organizational outcomes, including job attitudes (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2007), 
reactions to performance feedback (Korsgaard, Meglino, & Lester, 1997; Korsgaard, Meglino, & 
Lester, 2004), dispute resolution (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994), and leader behaviors (Blake & 
Mouton, 1964). Other-orientation appears to be particularly influential in the context of extra-
role behaviors related to helping others at work (e.g., prosocial or organizational citizenship 
behaviors; Korsgaard, Meglino, & Lester, 1996; Korsgaard, Meglino, Lester, & Jeong, 2010; 
Lester, Meglino, & Korsgaard, 2008; McNeely, 1991; McNeely & Meglino, 1994). In one field 
study, for example, other-orientation was shown to predict such behaviors more reliably than 
 
 
41 
several related constructs, including dispositional empathy and social value orientation 
(McNeely, 1991). In other studies, other-orientation has been shown to function as an enhancing 
moderator for various extra-role behavior antecedents (i.e., the effects of the antecedents are 
stronger at higher levels of other-orientation), including positive affect (Korsgaard et al., 1996), 
reciprocity expectations (Korsgaard et al., 2010), and job satisfaction (Lester et al., 2010). 
 Other-orientation is positively associated with dispositional empathy (Batson, 1998), 
perspective taking ability (Davis, 1983), and agreeableness (Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 
1996), and overlaps conceptually with concern for others (McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Ravlin & 
Meglino, 1987), prosocial motivation (Grant, 2008), prosocial values (Rioux & Penner, 2001), 
and prosocial personality (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995). The nature of the 
relationship between other-orientation and self-interest, however, remains a topic of open debate. 
Across a variety of academic disciplines, the prevailing assumption has long been that other-
orientation and self-interest represent opposite ends of a bipolar continuum (see Cropanzano et 
al., 2005). In this view, higher other-orientation necessarily implies lower self-interest. The 
theory of other-orientation (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004, 2007) follows in this tradition, 
integrating motivational orientations (self vs. other) with judgment processes (rational vs. 
heuristic) to explain individual behavior. The core logic of the theory is that the behavior of 
people higher in other-orientation is relatively sensitive to social influence, while the behavior of 
people higher in self-orientation is driven more by rational and self-interested processes (e.g., 
cost-benefit analysis; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004). This perspective is broadly consistent with 
theories of self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 1985) and individualism-collectivism (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), which suggest that people view themselves in terms of a similar continuum, 
ranging from independent and autonomous, to highly interdependent with others.  
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De Dreu (2006) challenged this view, and instead proposed the self-concern and other-
orientation as moderators (SCOOM) hypothesis (De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). The SCOOM 
hypothesis conceptualizes other-orientation and self-interest as independent, unipolar, and 
orthogonal dimensions. For workplace behavioral outcomes (e.g., job performance, prosocial 
behavior), self-interest is predicted to enhance the effects of individual-level antecedents (e.g., 
job characteristics), and other-orientation is predicted to enhance the effects of group-level 
antecedents (e.g., group climate). While only a few published studies to date have directly tested 
this framework, results of those efforts are largely consistent with SCOOM predictions (Bobocel, 
2013; De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). 
While reconciling the theory of other-orientation with the SCOOM model may represent 
an important direction for future inquiry, it lies well beyond the scope of the current research. 
Whatever the more general relationship between other-orientation and self-interest may be, in the 
context of safety-related decision making they are best conceptualized in terms of a single 
continuum. As argued above, the amount of harm perceived in this context is a function of an 
individual’s level of construal. Other-orientation, then, determines the extent to which these 
perceptions involve harm to others. If harm perceptions must be either other-oriented or self-
oriented, individuals who are lower in other-orientation must necessarily perceive more self-
oriented, or personal, harm, and can therefore be reasonably described as more self-interested.  
The extent to which other-orientation should be considered a trait (vs. state) construct is 
another important conceptual consideration. If other-orientation is a malleable psychological 
state, readily influenced by priming effects, it may not be possible to conceptually or empirically 
distinguish from construal level. Illustrating this concern, several findings demonstrate that state-
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level correlates of other-orientation (e.g., empathic concern; Small & Loewenstein, 2008) may 
co-vary with construal level (via social distance).   
In most of the extant literature, however, other-orientation is described as a stable, if not 
dispositional, individual difference (i.e., a trait; George, 1991). A recent review of the prosocial 
motivation literature concluded that, while prosocial motivation can be a trait or state, 
applications of other-orientation reflect a predominantly trait-like construct (Bolino & Grant, 
2016). At least one discussion of other-orientation does suggest that the construct may include 
both trait and state components (Korsgaard et al., 2010). However, the state components 
described in this account involve observable contextual factors, such as group membership 
(Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), and other-orientedness of work tasks 
(Smeesters, Wheeler, & Kay, 2009). These factors are unlikely to be affected by changes in 
construal level. Perceptions of objective features of the work environment may be influenced by 
changes in an individual’s level of construal, but not the features themselves. Thus, treating 
construal level and other-orientation as independent, orthogonal, constructs appears to be an 
appropriate choice. 
Other-Orientation as a Moderator 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts a main effect of construal level on ethical decision frame adoption. 
At lower levels of construal, harmful safety outcomes (i.e., accidents) will appear more probable 
and vivid, encouraging decision makers to recognize the ethical implications of their choices. At 
higher levels of construal, in contrast, possible harm will appear more distal and less salient, 
leading safety decisions to be categorized in non-ethical terms (e.g., as business, personal, or 
legal decisions). 
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As explained above, however, this account is based on the assumption of interpersonal 
harm. In practice, decision makers might also—or instead—perceive potential personal harm. 
Drawing on the theory of other-orientation (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004, 2007), differences in 
motivational orientation can be modeled to provide a more complete explanation of the construal 
level-ethical decision frame link.  
 When other-orientation is high, the effect of construal level on ethical decision frame 
adoption should be particularly strong. People high in other-orientation exhibit greater concern, 
or caring, for others (Korsgaard et al., 2010). Caring for (potential) victims of suffering is an 
important component of moral judgment (Baron-Cohen, 2011; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), 
suggesting that high other-orientation might pre-dispose an individual to recognize the ethical 
content of safety-related decisions. At lower levels of construal, this predisposition should have 
the greater impact. Harmful outcomes (i.e., accidents) are perceived to be particularly likely, and 
potential victims are perceived to be interpersonally closer, increasing the ethical intensity of the 
situation.  
 At higher levels of construal, in contrast, accidents are perceived as less likely, and 
potential victims of those accidents as more socially distant. These tendencies may reduce, or 
even eliminate, the benefits of other-orientation, by reducing situation-specific caring. General 
concern for the well-being of others may not translate to ethical decision frame adoption if no 
threat to others’ well-being is perceived (i.e., because the probability of an accident is perceived 
to be vanishingly small), or if the specific others at risk do not arouse empathic concern (i.e., 
because they are perceived from great social distance). Based on this logic, I predict that the 
effect of construal level on ethical decision frame adoption will be particularly strong at high 
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levels of other-orientation—other-orientation will increase the degree of ethical framing at lower 
levels of construal, but will not have a comparable effect at higher levels of construal. 
 When other-orientation is low (or, alternatively, when self-interest is high), ethical 
decision framing may be more generally inhibited. Highly self-interested people are guided 
primarily by costs and benefits to the self in their decision making (i.e., as opposed to concern 
for others; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2007). In making safety-related decision, then, self-interested 
people will be more sensitive to the possibility that they themselves might be harmed in the event 
of an accident. 
When other-orientation is only moderately low (i.e., people focus more on potential harm 
to the self, but perceive at least some potential harm to others as well), a significant attenuation 
of the construal level-ethical decision frame effect should be observed. Lower levels of construal 
will still increase the likelihood of ethical decision frame adoption somewhat, by increasing the 
perceived likelihood of accidents and the interpersonal nearness of potential victims. However, 
this effect should be much weaker under low (vs. high) other-orientation, because the 
individual’s focus on self-interest will tend to crowd out any ethical considerations involved in a 
decision (i.e., empathic concern for others; Korsgaard et al., 2010). This crowding out of ethical 
considerations should also be applicable at higher levels of construal. However, higher levels of 
construal are predicted to result in minimal ethical framing even under high other-orientation. 
Thus, the absolute “cost” of low (vs. high) other-orientation should be much greater at lower 
levels of construal. 
Integrating the preceding discussion suggests that other-orientation will function as an 
enhancing moderator for the (negative) effect of construal level on ethical decision frame 
adoption. The effect should be particularly strong at higher levels of other-orientation, and 
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weaker (or non-existent) at lower levels of other-orientation. This prediction is broadly 
consistent with prior work in which other-orientation has been shown to moderate the effects of 
various attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction; Lester et al., 2008) and other psychological states (e.g., 
positive affect; Korsgaard et al., 1996) on dependent variables that involve helping or caring for 
others (e.g., prosocial behaviors; Korsgaard et al., 1996; Korsgaard et al., 2010; Lester et al., 
2010). Thus: 
Hypothesis 3. In the context of safety-related decisions, other-orientation will moderate 
the negative effect of construal level on the likelihood (or extent) of ethical decision 
frame adoption. At higher levels of other-orientation, this effect will be enhanced (i.e., 
become more strongly negative). At lower levels of other-orientation, this effect will be 
attenuated (i.e., become more weakly negative, or non-significant). 
When combined, Hypotheses 1-3 are consistent with a conditional indirect effect, or 
moderated mediation, model (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). Hypothesis 4 states this conditional 
indirect effect prediction, and can be interpreted as holistic statement of the complete theoretical 
model depicted in Figure 1.    
Hypothesis 4. In the context of safety-related decisions, the indirect effect of construal 
level on safety performance via ethical decision frame adoption will be conditional upon 
the level of other-orientation. At higher levels of other orientation, the (negative) indirect 
effect of construal level will be strong. At lower levels of other orientation, the indirect 
effect of construal level will be weak, or non-significant. 
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CHAPTER 6: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Overview of Studies 
 The current research consists of three empirical studies designed to provide a complete 
and rigorous test of the theoretical model depicted in Figure 1. These studies complement one 
another, taking advantage of diverse methodologies, research populations, and approaches to 
operationalizing the model variables. This strategy (i.e., methodological triangulation; Denzin, 
1978) allows for greater confidence in the validity and replicability of empirical findings. 
 Study 1 tested the link between construal level and ethical decision frame adoption in an 
explicitly safety-related context (Hypothesis 2). This was achieved through a quasi-experimental 
survey study, completed by employees of an offshore drilling organization. Study 2 was a multi-
round simulation study, which was conducted in the laboratory and included a between-subjects 
manipulation of the independent variable. Control and random assignment provided internal 
validity, but Study 2 also demonstrated external validity, as participants were required to make a 
series of complex, ambiguous decisions in a simulation (and physical environment) carefully 
designed to evoke a specific organizational context. Study 2 included a behavioral outcome 
measure, and allowed for tests of Hypotheses 1-3. Study 3 was a relatively straightforward 
laboratory experiment, in which both the independent variable and hypothesized moderator were 
manipulated between-subjects, providing a controlled, holistic, test of the complete theoretical 
model depicted in Figure 1 (Hypotheses 1-4). 
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Measurement Strategy 
Construal level. Construal level is best understood in terms of a continuum of 
abstraction, rather than a categorical distinction between high- and low-level construal 
(Liberman & Trope, 2014; Trope & Liberman, 2010). The preceding hypotheses are stated 
accordingly. In Studies 1-3, however, construal level is manipulated with two levels (high vs. 
low), and results are interpreted in terms of contrasts between the high- and low-level conditions. 
This methodological choice is consistent with the overwhelming majority of studies in which 
construal level is included as an independent variable (for a review, see Trope & Liberman, 
2010), and offers several advantages. First, manipulation with random assignment to levels of the 
independent variable offers greater experimental control and internal validity. Second, because I 
have theorized that safety-related decisions will tend to promote higher levels of construal, 
measuring natural variation in construal level might result in range restriction. Third, this 
approach directly tests the practical utility of construal-based interventions, as managers might 
employ similar methods to “nudge” employee behavior. Finally, while several manipulations of 
construal level have been developed and validated in prior research, I am aware of no scale-
based measure of construal level that can be reliably applied across contexts. Potential 
limitations resulting from this methodological choice are noted in the general discussion. 
 Ethical decision frame. In some prior work (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999), decision 
frame adoption has been operationalized categorically. This approach is consistent with logic of 
appropriateness theory (Messick, 1999), in which decision frames are conceptualized as discrete 
sets of decision making rules for specific contexts. In other words, a decision maker either 
adopts, or does not adopt, an ethical frame. However, related research involving moral awareness 
(e.g., Singhapakdi et al., 1996) and moral conviction (e.g., Skitka et al., 2005) relies on 
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continuous (i.e., rating scale) measures to operationalize these constructs, and some scholars 
have more recently suggested that similarly meaningful differences may exist in the degree to 
which an individual adopts an ethical frame (Kreps & Monin, 2011). Because dichotomization of 
continuous or graduated variables artificially reduces statistical power and variance accounted 
for (Cohen, 1983), I used rating-scale measures of ethical decision frame adoption in Studies 1-3. 
However, I also included a dichotomous measure (followed Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) in 
Studies 2-3, to allow for comparison between these two approaches.  
 Other-orientation vs. Self-interest. Debate persists as to whether other-orientation and 
self-interest should be treated as endpoints of a bipolar continuum (following the theory of other-
orientation; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004, 2007), or as distinct, orthogonal, constructs (following 
the self-concern and other-orientation as moderators hypothesis; De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). In 
Study 2, I used a measure adapted from prior work (Bobocel, 2013; De Dreu & Nauta, 2009), 
including multiple items corresponding to both other-orientation and self-interest. These items 
could therefore be aggregated completely to form a single measure (following Meglino & 
Korsgaard, 2004), or analyzed separately (following De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). 
 In Study 3, I manipulated other-orientation versus self-interest. Similar manipulations 
have been used both in studies that conceptualize these variables in terms of a single continuum 
(e.g., Korsgaard et al., 2010), and in studies in which they are regarded as distinct constructs or 
treatments (e.g., Grant & Hofmann, 2011). I also included the same rating-scale measure from 
Study 2 (as a manipulation check), and two separate implicit measures. As in Study 2, the 
inclusion of multiple measures allowed me to compare alternative approaches to conceptualizing 
these variables (i.e., bipolar continuum vs. orthogonal constructs).  
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CHAPTER 7: STUDY 1 
Method 
 Study 1 was conducted at the training center of a large offshore drilling organization 
based in the Southeastern U.S. Participants were current employees taking part in a routine 
training course. During a break in the training schedule, employees were invited to participate in 
a brief, voluntary study. 
Participants 
 Seventy-four employees elected to participate in the study. All participants were men, 
and the mean age was 37.9 years (SD = 7.8). Participants represented a wide range of roles in the 
organization, from “roughneck” to “rig manager”—the lowest- and highest-ranking positions on 
an offshore drilling vessel, respectively. Participants averaged 4.8 years (SD = 4.1) in their 
current position, 12.9 years (SD = 8.0) with the organization, and 15.4 years (SD = 8.6) in the 
offshore drilling industry. In terms of education, 18.9 percent of participants had earned a 
bachelor’s degree, 2.7 percent had earned a vocational or technical degree, 25.7 percent had 
completed some college, 48.7 percent had earned a high school diploma (or equivalent), and 4 
percent had not completed high school. 
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a single-factor1 between-subjects 
design, with two levels of the manipulated variable (construal level: low vs. high). The 
                                                 
1 Study 1 also included a between-subjects manipulation of time pressure (low vs. high). Participants were asked to 
“Imagine it is a very busy [relatively slow] day on the rig.” However, this manipulation was embedded in the 
instructions for a measure not reported in the current research (safety role definitions), and did not significantly 
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manipulation involved two steps. First, participants were presented with a series of three 
photographs, and asked to write a few words about what they observed in each. The photographs 
varied by condition. Participants in the low-level construal condition were presented with 
photographs of specific workstations aboard the company’s drilling vessels, while participants in 
the high-level construal condition were instead presented with “bird’s eye” photos of the entire 
vessels. This manipulation is consistent with prior research linking construal to spatial location 
(e.g., Bar-Anan et al., 2006; Bar-Anan et al., 2007), and with the “trees” (low-level construal) vs. 
“forest” (high-level construal) metaphor commonly invoked by construal level theorists (e.g., 
Henderson & Trope, 2009; Smith & Trope, 2006; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006). 
 Second, participants completed an open-ended writing task, in which they were asked to 
write a brief essay about safety in their workplace. Participants in the low-level construal 
condition were asked to “provide 3-4 thoughts as to how employees might make safety in the 
workplace a priority,” while participants in the high-level construal condition were asked to 
“provide 3-4 thoughts as to why employees might make safety in the workplace a priority.” This 
manipulation reflects the foundational argument that, for actions, low-level construal leads one to 
focus on subordinate means (i.e., how the action is performed), while high-level construal leads 
one to focus on superordinate purpose (i.e., why the action is performed; Fujita, Henderson, Eng, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). These essays 
were coded to test the effectiveness of the manipulation. 
 Participants next responded to measures of ethical decision frame, moral disengagement, 
and a few demographic variables. Upon completion of these items, participants were debriefed 
and thanked. 
                                                 
correlate with any variables of interest in the study. I controlled for time pressure condition in all analyses, but the 
decision to include or omit this control does not substantively change any results. 
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Measures 
Ethical decision frame. With the assistance of managers and training leaders in the 
participating organization, I developed a set of ten workplace safety standards intended to be 
familiar and relevant to all training participants. Sample items: “Making sure others are wearing 
appropriate PPE [personal protective equipment],” “Maintaining a clean and organized work 
station,” and “Making proactive suggestions about how to make work safer.” For each standard, 
participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a single statement (following 
Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1990): “This choice involves ethical issues,” using a seven-point response 
scale (1 = “Strongly disagree;” 7 = “Strongly agree”). Participants’ responses were consistent 
across items (Cronbach’s α = .98). 
Moral disengagement. Participants’ level of moral disengagement with an eight-item 
scale validated in prior research (sample item: “People can’t be blamed for doing things that are 
technically wrong when their coworkers are doing it too;” Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & 
Mayer, 2012). Moral disengagement refers to the psychological process of convincing oneself 
that ethical standards do not apply, allowing an individual to behave unethically without feeling 
distress (Bandura, 1990). Moral disengagement predicts a wide range of unethical behaviors 
(Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Bandura, Caprara, & Zsolnai, 2000; Detert, Treviño, & 
Sweitzer, 2008; Moore et al., 2012; Welsh et al., 2014). Thus, this measure provided a test of the 
effects of construal level manipulation on ethical decision making more broadly, in contrast to 
the ethical decision frame measure (which focused on specific, safety-related decisions). 
Participants responding using a seven-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree;” 7 = “strongly agree”), 
and the measure was internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .86). 
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Demographic variables. Participants also responded to demographic items, including 
age, educational attainment, job title, job tenure, organizational tenure, and industry tenure. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all study variables are reported in 
Table 1. 
Manipulation Check 
 The construal level manipulation consisted of two steps, which allowed for two separate 
tests of the effectiveness of the manipulation. Two independent coders, who were blind to 
condition, first rated each of the three open-ended responses written by participants concerning 
what they observed in the manipulation photographs. Responses were coded using a seven-point 
scale anchored at “1 = very concrete (i.e., detail-focused)” and “7 = very abstract (i.e., big 
picture-focused).” Consistency between raters was assessed using the average deviation statistic 
(Burke & Dunlap, 2002). The computed AD value of .53 was below the relevant critical value 
(.74), indicating a statistically significant level of interrater agreement (p < .05; Smith-Crowe, 
Burke, Cohen, & Doveh, 2014). Internal consistency across the three responses was modest 
(Cronbach’s α = .62). Ratings were averaged across coders and responses to form a single index. 
OLS regression revealed a main effect of experimental condition, β = .29, t(73) = 2.60, p = .01. 
Participants in the high-level construal condition gave more abstract descriptions of the 
photographs (M = 4.66, SD = 1.76) than did participants in the low-level construal condition (M 
= 3.59, SD = 1.78). 
 Two condition-blind, independent coders also rated participants’ workplace safety essays, 
using a seven-point scale anchored at “1 = entirely focused on subordinate actions” and “7 = 
entirely focused on superordinate goals.” The computed AD value of .37 was also below the 
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relevant critical value (.65; Smith-Crowe et al., 2014), indicating statistically significant 
interrater agreement, and coders’ ratings were averaged to form a single index. Regression 
results indicated a main effect of experimental condition, β = .90, t(73) = 18.50, p < .001. Essays 
written by participants in the high-level construal condition were more focused on superordinate 
goals (M = 6.56, SD = 1.26) than were essays written by those in the low-level construal 
condition (M = 1.57, SD = 1.09). Thus, two separate tests indicated that the construal level 
manipulation was successful.  
Hypothesis Test 
 Regression results for Study 1 are presented in Table 2. Because responses to the ethical 
decision frame measure were consistent within-persons, the individual items were averaged to 
form a single index of participants’ tendency to adopt an ethical decision frame with respect to 
safety performance2. OLS regression revealed a significant main effect of construal β = -.25, 
t(73) = -2.21, p = .03. Participants in the low-level construal condition (M = 6.56, SD = 0.58) 
adopted ethical decision frames to a greater extent than did participants in the high-level 
construal condition (M = 5.88, SD = 1.77), providing initial support for Hypothesis 2 (see Figure 
2). This effect was entirely robust to controlling for moral disengagement, β = -.25, t(73) = -2.31, 
p = .02. 
Additional Analyses 
In contrast, regression results indicated no effect of the construal level manipulation on 
moral disengagement, β = .00, t(73) = 0.03, n.s. No difference in moral disengagement was 
                                                 
2 The structure of these data might be interpreted as nested (i.e., individual safety standards nested within 
participants). After stacking the data, an ANOVA revealed significant within-person variance, F(9,657) = 6.48, p < 
.001, although between-person variance was much greater, F(73,657) = 68.88, p < .001. Taking this non-
independence into account, mixed linear regression (controlling for safety standard and clustering by participant) 
revealed a significant main effect of construal level, b = -.68, t(73) = -2.26, p = .03, providing comparable support 
for Hypothesis 2.  
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observed between participants in the high- (M = 2.17, SD = 0.88) and low-level (M = 2.17, SD = 
1.20) construal conditions. This result might be interpreted as evidence that no “general” 
relationship exists between construal level and ethical decision making, or it might be argued 
that moral disengagement is a relatively stable individual difference (e.g., Moore et al., 2012) 
and therefore unlikely to be influenced by subtle experimental manipulations. 
The ethical decision frame measure correlated significantly with moral disengagement, 
r(73) = -.30, p = .009, indicating that participants higher in moral disengagement were less likely 
to adopt an ethical decision frame with respect to safety performance. This finding is consistent 
with prior work in which moral disengagement predicts more specific forms of ethical decision 
making (e.g., Aquino et al., 2007; Detert et al., 2008; Welsh et al., 2014).    
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CHAPTER 8: STUDY 2 
Method 
Study 2 extended the results of Study 1 in several ways. First, the construal level 
manipulation developed for Study 1 was validated in a controlled, laboratory setting, with 
research participants who were naïve (i.e., had no professional experience in the offshore drilling 
industry). Second, Study 2 included behavioral measures of safety performance, providing 
multiple tests of Hypothesis 2; and a self-reported measure of other-orientation, allowing for an 
initial test of Hypothesis 3. Third, these hypothesis tests were embedded in a contextually rich 
decision making simulation, balancing internal and external validity.  
Participants 
 Eighty-five adults were recruited from a paid participant pool at a large research 
university in the Southeastern U.S. Six participants were removed from analyses for failing to 
follow basic instructions (e.g., missing deadlines), resulting in a final sample of 79. The majority 
of these participants (73.4 percent) were currently-enrolled undergraduate students, while the rest 
were current graduate students (12.7 percent), former students (6.3 percent), university staff (1.3 
percent), and community members not affiliated with the university (6.3 percent). The average 
age of participants was 22.7 years (SD = 5.9), and 64.6 percent were women.  
Simulation 
 During the study, participants completed an adapted version of Deepwater: A 
Competitive Business Ethics Simulation Game (Buck, 2015). Deepwater is a competitive 
decision making exercise in which participants simulate the management of an offshore drilling 
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vessel operating in the Gulf of Mexico. The simulation challenges participants to make a series 
of iterative, interrelated decisions under uncertainty, while managing multiple goals (e.g., 
profitability, accident prevention). Study 2 was the first use of Deepwater in an empirical 
research setting. Minor adaptations were made to remove explicit references to ethics from the 
simulation interface and training materials.    
Procedure 
 Randomization. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in single factor (i.e., 
construal level: high vs. low), between-subjects design. All participants completed the study as 
individuals. However, the nature of the experimental manipulation required that assignment be 
randomized at the level of the study session, rather than at the level of the individual participant. 
A total of 13 sessions were conducted, with between five and eight participants enrolled in each 
session. 
 Training. The study procedure took approximately three hours in total. Upon arriving in 
the lab, participants were first taken to the “training room,” to prepare for the simulation. In the 
training room, participants spent 25 minutes individually reviewing the training materials, which 
included the participant handbook, a “quick reference guide” summarizing key simulation 
parameters and assumptions, an example prospectus, and a description of the Beaufort wind 
force scale. The experimenter then conducted a short presentation, which involved summarizing 
information from the training materials, demonstrating use of the simulation interface, and 
answering any participant questions. To promote a sense of economic competition, participants 
were given the opportunity to win performance-based raffle tickets. Specifically, in each session, 
the participant with the highest net income in each round received one raffle ticket, and the top 
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three overall performers (again, in terms of net income) received additional raffle tickets. At the 
conclusion of the study, a raffle drawing was conducted, and three winners received gift cards. 
 Following the presentation, participants accessed the simulation and completed a non-
competitive “practice round,” in order to familiarize themselves with the interface. After 
reviewing the results of the practice round, participants next completed a short, interactive, 
knowledge quiz, covering several critical simulation details. The quiz alerted participants to any 
incorrectly answered questions, and required participants to correct their work before advancing. 
The purpose of the quiz was to ensure that all participants began the simulation with complete 
knowledge of these details, including safety-related standards and best practices (e.g., the 
recommended baseline expenditure for safety programs of $1.2 million per simulation round).   
After completing the quiz, participants had approximately ten minutes left in the training 
room, in which they could continue review the training materials, explore the simulation 
interface, or ask the experimenter questions. 
Manipulation. Once the training phase of the study was complete, participants were 
taken from the “training room,” to the “decision making room.” The layout of the decision 
making room provided the manipulation of construal level (see Appendix 2). The context of the 
deepwater drilling industry provides a natural contrast in construal level, between decision 
makers who work aboard drilling vessels (i.e., “in the trees” of the drilling operation), and those 
who work in onshore command centers (i.e., conventional office environments in which the 
drilling operation is physically—and psychologically—distant). To simulate this contrast, large 
color photographs were affixed to the walls surrounding participants’ cubicles. Following Study 
1, “bird’s eye” photographs of various deepwater drilling vessels were utilized for the high-level 
construal condition, while photographs of specific work areas aboard those vessels (e.g., 
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drillfloor; derricks) were utilized for the low-level construal condition. The same set of 
condition-specific images was also embedded in the survey participants completed while in the 
decision making room. To reduce the likelihood of this manipulation also affecting participants’ 
degree of other-focus, no human figures were included in either set of photographs. 
 Simulation. Participants competed in a version of the Deepwater simulation that 
consisted of six rounds, and took approximately two hours to complete (15 minutes per round, 
plus short breaks prior to round 1, and after rounds 3 and 6). At the beginning of each round, 
participants were asked to make a set of interrelated decisions concerning the operations, 
expenditures, and staffing of their drilling vessel. Each round, participants decided (1) whether to 
produce oil or suspend operations; (2) whether to service their vessel’s blowout prevention 
device; (3) what crude oil production target to set; (4) how much money to spend maintaining 
their vessel; (5) how much money to spend on safety programs; (6) how many workers to hire 
and fire, if any; (7) how many workers to send for onshore training; and (8) how much money to 
spend on pollution control equipment, if any. 
At the conclusion of each round, the experimenter made a brief announcement in the 
decision making room, notifying participants of the top performers in the current round, and 
overall (by net income). Participants then received an “Operations and Financial Report,” which 
included detailed information about their vessel’s production, final performance, equipment 
condition, and environmental impact, as well as any adverse safety outcomes, which might 
include safety violations, crew-member injuries, crew-member fatalities, and blowouts 
(catastrophic explosions that may occur when well control is lost). While adverse safety 
outcomes were, on aggregate, correlated with participants’ choices (e.g., decreasing safety 
program spending increased the likelihood of injuries and safety violations), the relationship was 
 
 
60 
not deterministic—the simulation, like the real-world industry it models, involved significant 
uncertainty. Participants also received a “Market Report,” which listed their overall financial, 
operating, and social cost figures to date, relative to their competitors (i.e., the other participants 
in the study session). 
Participants also received information about the current and forecasted weather for the 
Gulf of Mexico, and the current spot price for crude oil. These exogenous factors were intended 
to provide an additional layer of uncertainty and complexity in participants’ decision making. 
The trajectory of weather conditions and oil prices over the course of the simulation was 
identical for all participants. While oil prices were relatively stable across all six rounds, weather 
conditions worsened over the first four rounds, culminating with a tropical storm in round 4, and 
then improved for the final two rounds. 
 The simulation parameters were set to make profitability attainable, but difficult (65.8 
percent of participants finished the simulation with an overall net loss). As in the real world, 
participants faced temptation to increase profits in the short-term by decreasing spending on 
safety programs. To heighten this tension between safety and profit, a more competitive 
environment was promoted in three ways: (1) the experimenter described the net income-based 
raffle during the training phase of the study; (2) the experimenter announced the top performers 
publicly at the conclusion of each round; and (3) through the Market Report, which served as 
more detailed “leaderboard” with which participants could compare their individual performance 
to that of their competitors in the study session.  
 Survey. In between rounds of the simulation (and prior to the start of the first), 
participants responded to several survey questions. These measures are described in detail below. 
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At the end of the simulation, participants responded to a few final items, and were then 
debriefed, paid, and thanked. 
Measures 
 Dependent variable: Safety program spending. In each of the six simulation rounds, 
participants chose an amount to spend on safety programs. The simulation training materials 
informed participants that these programs, which included on-the-job training and emergency 
drills, would decrease the likelihood of accidents that could injure or kill workers. Thus, of all 
decisions made during the simulation, safety program spending was most clearly and directly 
related to participants’ safe performance. The training materials also provided a recommended 
“baseline” expenditure of $1.2 million per round, but stressed that this amount was neither a 
minimum nor a maximum. Participants were not required to spend any money on safety 
programs, and could spend up to $20 million per round. 
 I focused in particular on participants’ safety program spending during round 1 of the 
simulation. In later rounds, participants’ decisions might be anchored by competitors’ spending 
(revealed through the Market Report), or reactive to the results of previous rounds (e.g., spending 
more on safety programs after an injury occurs). Prior to making their round 1 decisions, in 
contrast, participants were exposed only to the experimental manipulation and training materials. 
However, participants’ safety spending decisions were also internally consistent across rounds 
(Cronbach’s α = .81). All analyses are therefore reported for both round 1 safety spending and 
aggregate safety spending (i.e., total spending across all 6 rounds).  
 Mediator: Ethical decision frame.  
 The study included a total of four measures of ethical decision frame. 
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Coded Measure (before Round 1). After moving to the decision making room (and being 
exposed to the experimental manipulation), but before entering their round 1 decisions, all 
participants responded to an open-ended writing prompt, “Please spend 2-3 minutes writing 
about your strategy for the simulation. That is, what do you hope to accomplish?” Responses to 
this prompt were coded to provide the manipulation check (see below), but were also coded to 
provide an unobtrusive measure of whether or not participants adopted an ethical decision frame. 
This approach was desirable because it did not alert participants to our interest in ethical decision 
making, which might have influenced their behavior during the simulation. 
  Two independent judges coded each response. Responses were coded 1 when 
participants explicitly cited harm prevention as a consideration in their strategy, indicating of an 
ethical decision frame (e.g., “My main concern is to keep all workers on the rig from harm at all 
costs;” Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Responses that did not reference harm prevention were 
coded 0. The judges met to discuss disagreements with guidance from the author, and were able 
to resolve all disagreements. Thirteen participants (16.5 percent) in total adopted an ethical 
decision frame. 
 Implicit Measure (Before Round 1). Also prior to the start of the simulation, participants 
completed a word fragment task. Such tasks assess implicit cognitive processes (Bassili & Smith, 
1986; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982), and in this case provided an implicit measure of ethical 
decision frame adoption. Specifically, participants were presented with a randomly-ordered list 
of eight word-fragments (e.g., “p _ r _”), of which four could be completed using either neutral 
words (e.g., “mild,” “vortex”), or words associated with ethical virtue and purity (e.g., “kind,” 
“virtue;” Sherman & Clore, 2009; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). The number of ethics-related 
words identified provided the measure of ethical decision frame adoption. 
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 Explicit Categorical Measure (Before Round 4). Between the third and fourth rounds of 
the simulation, participants were asked to categorize the “type” of each of the eight simulation 
decisions described above (following Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). For each decision (e.g., 
“How much crude oil to produce”), participants were asked to “indicate which label best 
describes each of the following decisions for you.” The available choices were: ethical decision, 
personal decision, legal decision, and environmental decision. 
 Explicit Continuous Measure (After Simulation). At the conclusion of the simulation, 
participants completed a scale-based measure of ethical decision framing, adapted from Study 1. 
For each of the eight simulation decisions, participants rated their level of agreement with the 
statement, “This decision involves ethical issues.” Participants responded using a 7-point scale (1 
= strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Responses were internally consistent across decisions 
(Cronbach’s α = .85). 
 Moderator: Other-orientation vs. self-interest. At the end of the simulation, participants 
self-reported the degree to which they had focused on the well-being of others, versus their own 
well-being, as they made their decisions. Other-orientation and self-interest were measured using 
two items each, adapted to this context from a more general measure of workplace other-
orientation (De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). For other-orientation, the items were “During the 
simulation, I thought about how others might be harmed by my decisions,” and “I was concerned 
with how my decisions might impact others’ well-being.” Participants responded using a 7-point 
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The items were significantly correlated, r(78) = 
.95, p < .001, and were averaged to form a single index. For self-interest, the items were “During 
the simulation, I thought about how my decisions might harm me personally,” and “It felt as 
though I might be harmed as a result of my decisions during the simulation.” Participants 
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responded using the same rating scale. The items were also correlated, r(78) = .95, p < .001. The 
indices computed for other-orientation and self-interest were not significantly correlated, r(78) = 
.17, p = .13. Other-orientation and self-interest were therefore analyzed separately, rather than 
aggregating. 
 Other-orientation was measured, rather than manipulated, in Study 2 for several reasons. 
Participants were exposed to the primary manipulation (construal level) for the duration of the 
study, making it likely that any secondary manipulation would be overshadowed. Second, the 
study design involved no possibility of harm to participants themselves, which limited the 
potential strength of any other-orientation vs. self-interest manipulation (contrast with Grant & 
Hofmann, 2011). Lastly, by making drillers’ workstations appear more or less proximal in the 
“decision making room,” the construal level manipulation might itself activate other-orientation, 
potentially confounding a secondary manipulation. Measuring other-orientation enabled me to 
test this possibility empirically (other-orientation was not significantly related to the construal 
manipulation, r(78) = .00, p > .5), and to conduct an initial test of Hypothesis 3. 
 Control variables: Session week and day. Participants were assigned to experimental 
conditions at the session level (i.e., rather than the individual level). To address the possibility of 
session effects, I included dummy codes for the week in which the session took place (the study 
was conducted over the course of four weeks), and the day of the week, in all analyses. Unless 
otherwise indicated, inclusion of these control variables did not substantively alter the results. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all study variables are reported in 
Table 3. 
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Manipulation Check 
 The effectiveness of the construal level manipulation was assessed by coding 
participants’ responses to the open-ended prompt about their approach to the simulation, 
described above. The term “strategy” was selected for this prompt due to its relative ambiguity 
from a construal level standpoint—participants might respond by planning specific tactics 
(lower-level construal), or describing overarching goals (higher-level construal; Reyt et al., 
2016). Responses were rated using a 7-point scale, with 1 indicating the lowest level of construal 
(i.e., complete focus on subordinate actions), and 7 indicating the highest level of construal (i.e., 
complete focus on superordinate objectives). To illustrate, the response, “My general goals are 
simple. Produce and profit at a high level. Keep injuries down,” received a rating of 7 from both 
coders. An example of a response that received a 1 from both coders is:  
Do my best to not repair the rig completely and spend a little bit less [than] the minimum 
suggest for each round, maybe proceeding to complete [blowout preventer overhaul] mid 
experiment or a quick [blowout prevent overhaul] before the end, if I see the weather is 
getting higher than 8 I will proceed to a shut in, and a reparation if necessary. Increase 
the number of employee[s] in training and freeze the number of new employees. 
Consistency between raters was assessed using the average deviation statistic (Burke & 
Dunlap, 2002). The computed AD value of .40 was below the relevant critical value (.73), 
indicating a statistically significant level of interrater agreement (p < .05; Smith-Crowe et al., 
2014). These ratings were therefore averaged to form a single index. OLS regression results 
revealed a main effect of experimental condition, β = .27, t(70) = 2.27, p = .03. Participants in 
the high-level construal condition described their strategy for the simulation in more goal-
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focused terms (M = 4.99, SD = 1.78) than did participants in the low-level construal condition (M 
= 4.01, SD = 2.14). These results indicate a successful manipulation. 
At the conclusion of the simulation, participants’ level of psychological distance was 
assessed, with respect to the workers on their vessel. Participants responded to a nine-item 
measure (adapted from Kim, Harrison, & Martins, 2016), which included three items each 
corresponding to social, temporal, and spatial distance (e.g., “When I think about the workers on 
my rig… it feels like they are physically close to me”). This measure was internally consistent 
(Cronbach’s α = .85); however, analyses revealed no main effect of condition, β = -.03, t(70) = -
0.20, n.s. Participants in the high-level construal condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.34) did not report 
greater psychological distance from workers than did participants in the low-level construal 
condition (M = 3.63, SD = 1.31). 
Hypothesis Tests 
 Regression results revealed a significant main effect of construal level on round 1 safety 
program spending, β = -.26, t(70) = -2.18, p = .03. The effect of construal level on total (i.e., 
aggregate) safety program spending was also marginally significant, β = -.21, t(70) = -1.73, p = 
.09 (p < .05 one-tailed). Participants in the low-level construal condition spent more on safety 
programs in round 1 (M = $3.62 million, SD = $4.50 million), and overall (M = $15.3 million, 
SD = $16.1 million), than did participants in the high-level construal condition (round 1: M = 
$1.80 million, SD = $1.85 million; overall: M = $10.7 million, SD = $7.72 million). These results 
indicate a direct effect of construal level on safety performance, such that participants in the low-
level construal condition performed more safely. 
 Because Study 2 used dichotomous operationalizations of ethical decision frame, it was 
necessary to evaluate the two stages of the hypothesized moderated mediation model (see Figure 
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1) separately. Specifically, the first stage was estimated using binary logistic regression for 
dichotomous measures (the coded and explicit categorical measures), and using OLS regression 
for the continuous measures (the implicit measure and explicit continuous measure). The second 
stage was estimated using OLS regression.  
First stage. The first stage of the model was analyzed hierarchically (see Table 3). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that lower levels of construal increases the likelihood of adopting an 
ethical frame for safety-relevant decisions. To test this prediction, I first estimated a model 
including only the main effects of construal level and other-orientation as predictors (in addition 
to the session-level controls described above). Correlations between the various ethical decision 
frame measures were, in many cases, non-significant (see Table 1). For the coded measure of 
ethical decision frame adoption, the main effect of construal level on ethical decision frame 
adoption was not significant, Exp[b] = -.90, z(70) = -1.06, p > .1. The main effect of concern for 
others was significant, Exp[b] = 1.13, z(70) = 2.78, p = .005, indicating that participants who 
reported more other-orientation were more likely to adopt an ethical decision frame (controlling 
for experimental condition). Similarly, using the explicit, “categorization” measure, construal 
level was not a significant predictor, Exp[b] = -.28, z(70) = -0.59, p > .1, but other-orientation 
was, Exp[b] = .34, z(70) = 2.52, p = .01. Construal level was also not a significant predictor of 
the implicit (i.e., word completion) measure, or the explicit measure used in Study 1. Thus, 
across all four measures, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Other-orientation was a significant 
predictor of the explicit measure of ethical decision frame, β = .52, t(70) = 5.22, p < .001. 
The construal level X other-orientation interaction term was added as a predictor in the 
second model. Hypothesis 3 predicted that the strength of the construal level-ethical decision 
frame path depends upon an individual’s degree of other-orientation, such that the effect is 
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enhanced when other-orientation is high, and attenuated when other-orientation is low (or 
supplanted by self-interest). Using the coded measure of ethical decision frame adoption, the 
interaction effect was significant, Exp[b] = -5.86, z(68) = -2.36, p = .02. To interpret this 
interaction, I first analyzed simple slopes (Aiken & West, 1991) to compare the effects of 
construal level at different values of other-orientation. With other-orientation at its mean, the 
effect of construal level was non-significant, Exp[b] = 2.79, SE = 1.93, p = .15. One standard 
deviation below the mean of other-orientation, there was a marginally significant positive effect 
of construal level, Exp[b] = 8.18, SE = 4.24, p = .05, suggesting that participants low in other-
orientation were slightly more likely to adopt an ethical frame in the high-level construal 
condition. One standard deviation above the mean of other-orientation, however, there was a 
significant negative effect of construal level, Exp[b] = -2.60, SE = 1.02, p = .01, indicating that 
participants high in other-orientation were more likely to adopt an ethical decision frame in the 
low-level construal condition, as predicted. 
The logistic regression results were then used to compute predictive margins, which 
indicate the expected value of a dependent variable at specified values of the independent 
variables (Graubard & Korn, 1999). With other-orientation fixed at one standard deviation below 
its mean, the predicted margin for the ethical decision frame measure was .00 for the low-level 
construal condition, and .08 for the high-level construal condition. With other-orientation held 
one standard deviation above its mean, the predictive margin was .73 for the low-level construal 
condition, and .17 in the high-level construal condition (see Figure 3). In other words, low-level 
construal dramatically increased the likelihood of adopting an ethical decision frame among 
participants high in concern for others, but had little effect on participants low in concern for 
others.  
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Thus, support was found for Hypothesis 3 using the coded measure of ethical decision 
frame adoption—the only measure administered before participants implemented their strategy 
for round 1. However, the construal level X other-orientation interaction was non-significant in 
analyses involving the other three ethical decision frame measures, suggesting this result should 
be interpreted with some caution. 
 Second stage. The second stage of the model was analyzed using OLS regression (see 
Table 4). Hypothesis 1 predicted that adopting an ethical decision frame leads to greater safety 
performance. Consistent with this prediction, the effect of the coded ethical decision frame 
measure on round 1 safety program spending was significant, β = .40, t(70) = 3.67, p < .001. The 
spending of participants who adopted an ethical decision frame (M = $5.71 million, SD = $1.52 
million) was nearly three times that of participants who did not (M = $2.05 million, SD = $0.32 
million). The effect of ethical decision frame on total safety spending was also significant, β = 
.42, t(70) = 3.94, p < .001. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was also supported using this measure. Again, 
however, use of the other three measures of ethical decision frame adoption led to non-
significant results, for both round 1 safety spending and overall safety spending. 
Supplementary Analyses 
 Other behavioral outcomes from the simulation help to illustrate the complexity of 
construal level’s role in organizational decision making. In terms of performance, construal level 
had positive effects on both production volume and gross revenues, β = .26, t(70) = 2.14, p = .04, 
indicating that participants in the high-level construal condition set more aggressive production 
targets (because oil prices did not fluctuate between rounds, these measures were perfectly 
correlated). However, construal level did not predict net income, β = .17, t(70) = 1.44, p > .1, 
suggesting that higher revenues and lower levels of safety spending among participants in the 
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high-level construal condition were offset by other factors (e.g., fines for safety violations, other 
voluntary expenses). 
 Construal level did not predict spending on vessel maintenance, β = -.18, t(70) = 1.53, p > 
.1, or the number of workers sent to receive on-shore training, β = .02, t(70) = 0.13, p > .13. Both 
of these decisions had potential consequences for worker safety, which might suggest a 
prediction of increased maintenance spending and worker training in the low-level construal 
condition. On the other hand, these factors were also more distally or indirectly linked to 
possible accidents and injuries than safety program spending, suggesting that their significance 
might be more accessible to those thinking more abstractly (i.e., participants in the high-level 
construal condition). 
 Finally, construal level had a positive effect on pollution control spending, β = .29, t(70) 
= 2.26, p = .03, as participants in the high-level construal condition were more likely to install 
pollution control equipment during the first round (76.2 percent of participants, vs. 43.2 percent 
in the low-level construal condition), and to select more effective—and expensive—options 
(23.8 percent chose to install the most expensive of the four options, vs. 8.1 percent in the low-
level construal condition). The simulation provided participants no incentive whatsoever to 
invest in pollution control, other than feedback on the social cost (i.e., carbon footprint) of their 
business included in the Market Report. While environmental conservation and social cost 
reduction might reasonably be classified as ethical goals, they are also relatively abstract and far-
reaching in scope. Such goals, even within the ethical domain, might be more accessible at 
higher levels of construal. In keeping with this interpretation, prior work has shown that higher 
levels of construal lead to more future-benefiting choices in intergenerational dilemmas (for a 
                                                 
3 These results correspond to participants’ round 1 decisions; however, the aggregate effects are similar. 
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review, see Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009), and that certain ethical considerations are more salient 
at higher levels of construal (e.g., distributive vs. interactional justice; Cojuharenco et al., 2011). 
In a similar vein, it might be reasoned that harm to a broader set of stakeholders (e.g., future 
generations; the environment) may become more salient at higher levels of construal. 
Alternatively, however, the “bird’s eye” photographs displayed in the high-level 
construal condition might simply have increased the salience of environmental concerns, by 
depicting drilling vessels against the background of otherwise pristine oceanscapes.    
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CHAPTER 9: STUDY 3 
Method 
 Study 3 was a laboratory experiment, also conducted at a large research university in the 
Southeastern U.S. Study 3 employed a relatively simple, controlled, design intended to maximize 
internally validity. Both construal level and other-orientation (contrasted with self-interest) were 
experimentally manipulated, to allow for a complete test of the hypothesized moderated 
mediation model depicted in Figure 1. The design of Study 3 was also unrelated to the context of 
deepwater drilling, in which harm-based safety concerns may be unusually salient. By testing the 
same hypotheses in an entirely different, and relatively mundane, setting, Study 3 provided a test 
of the generalizability of the results of Studies 1 and 2.  
Participants 
 A total of 123 paid participants were recruited through an online pool, to take part in a 
“Model Building Study.” The majority of these participants (73.2 percent) were currently-
enrolled undergraduate students, while the rest were current graduate students (12.2 percent), 
former students (6.5 percent), university staff (3.3 percent), and community members not 
affiliated with the university (4.9 percent). The average age of participants was 23.6 years (SD = 
8.8), and 60.2 percent were women. 
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (construal level: high vs. low) x 
2 (other-orientation vs. self-interest) factor between-subjects design. When participants arrived in 
the laboratory, they were seated at individually partitioned computer stations. Dispensers of hand 
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sanitizer and anti-bacterial cleaning wipes were placed at each station. A placard describing “Lab 
Health and Safety Guidelines” was attached to each computer tower, positioned to be directly in 
the participant’s line of sight. The contents of this placard included the initial manipulations of 
both construal level and other-orientation vs. self-interest. Once participants were seated, the 
experimenter greeted them and explained the study procedure. During this introduction, the 
experimenter also called participants’ attention to the placard. In all conditions, the placard 
began with the following text: 
The weather may be getting warmer, but the flu is still going around campus. Because 
you’ll be working with your hands during this study, we ask that everyone do the 
following: 
1. When you are ready to build your model (i.e., after you complete the initial 
survey), please use the hand sanitizer on your desk to clean your hands. 
2. Once you have finished building your model and placed all pieces back in the 
bag, please use one of the cleaning wipes on your desk to clean your work tray. 
These lines served to establish the relevance of safety in the laboratory setting, and to 
communicate clear standards for safe performance. The remaining information on the placards 
varied by condition. First, other-orientation vs. self-interest was manipulated with the following 
text: 
We don’t want [YOU TO PASS / YOU TO CATCH] the flu [on to / from] other 
participants, or the research assistants running the study. Remember, the flu has a 
long incubation period, so even if [you haven’t had / they aren’t showing] any symptoms 
[you could still make others sick / others could still make you sick.] 
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 Then, construal level was manipulated. In the high-level construal conditions, the placard 
contained an additional block of text, which began with “Symptoms of the flu include,” and went 
on to list several familiar symptoms (e.g., “headache,” “warm, flushed skin”). In the low-level 
construal conditions, the same space on the placard was instead occupied by an image—an 
“emoji” ideogram depicting a generic face exhibiting the same flu symptoms that were described 
in the high-level construal conditions. This manipulation was developed for use in Study 3, 
following prior work which has shown that image-based stimuli activate lower levels of 
construal, while text-based stimuli activate higher levels of construal (Amit et al., 2009).   
 Participants began the study by first completing a short, computer-based survey. The 
survey’s introductory screen reminded participants to review the “Lab Health and Safety 
Guidelines” placard, and reinforced the manipulation of other-orientation vs. self-interest with a 
single line: “We don’t want you to make others sick,” vs. “We don’t want others to make you 
sick.”   
The next survey step provided a second, stronger manipulation of construal level. 
Following a procedure developed and validated for experimental CLT research (Freitas, 
Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004, Experiment 1), participants were asked to complete a “thought 
exercise worksheet.” Participants assigned to the high-level construal conditions were instructed 
to think about why they would engage in an activity, while participants assigned to the low-level 
construal conditions were asked to think about how they would engage in an activity (in all 
conditions, the activity was “health improvement”). Participants in the high-level construal 
conditions completed the thought exercise worksheet by thinking about the activity in 
increasingly abstract terms, successively indicating why they would engage in the activity, and 
why they would pursue each of the higher-level goals identified in their responses. Participants 
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in the low-level construal conditions instead completed the worksheet by thinking about the 
activity in increasingly concrete terms, successively indicating how they would engage in 
activity, and how they would engage in each of the lower-level activities identified in their 
responses. All participants were asked to provide responses across four levels of abstraction, 
whether increasing or decreasing (Freitas et al., 2004). These worksheets were subsequently 
coded to provide the manipulation check for construal level.  
 Participants next completed a word fragment task. Such tasks assess implicit cognitive 
processes (Bassili & Smith, 1986; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982), and in this case provided 
implicit measures of both ethical decision frame adoption and self-interest (the latter intended as 
a test of the other-orientation vs. self-control manipulation). Specifically, as in Study 2, 
participants were presented with a randomly-ordered list of eight word-fragments (e.g., “p _ r 
_”), of which four could be completed using either neutral words (e.g., “mild,” “vortex”), or 
words associated with ethical virtue and purity (e.g., “kind,” “virtue;” Sherman & Clore, 2009; 
Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). I preferred this list of words related to similar measures that 
instead highlight unethical behaviors (e.g., “fraud,” “cheat;” Gino & Bazerman, 2009), because 
the outcomes of interest in Study 3 contrasted proactive behavior with “sins of omission” (i.e., 
acting to promote hygiene and safety vs. failing to do so), as opposed to more explicitly unethical 
“sins of commission” (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). Moreover, because safety performance 
was operationalized in terms of hygiene in Study 3, I anticipated that words related to ethical 
purity would be relatively accessible for participants.  
The remaining four word-fragments were developed for this study, and could be 
completed using either neutral words (e.g., “mint;” “golf”), or words associated with focus on the 
self (e.g., “mine;” “self”). Because these word sets were seemingly unrelated, presenting them 
 
 
76 
together also served to conceal the goal of the measure (following Gino & Desai, 2012). The 
number of ethics- and self-related words used by each participant was independently summed to 
provide the two measures (both ranging in value from 0 to 4). 
After completing this measure, participants were instructed to notify the experimenter 
that they were ready to begin the model-building task. The experimenter brought each participant 
a ceramic tray, which contained (1) the 72 Lego pieces needed to assemble a small model car, (2) 
an instruction booklet containing step-by-step assembly instructions, and (3) an empty, sealable, 
plastic bag. Participants were instructed to build the car following the instructions in the booklet, 
allowing for an objective measure of model-building performance (i.e., the highest-numbered 
“step” completed).  
Participants were given five minutes to assemble their model cars4, and a timer was 
displayed on screen as they worked. Because the “Lab Health and Safety Guidelines” instructed 
participants to clean their hands with hand sanitizer before beginning this task, the experimenter 
discreetly coded whether or not participants had done so at this point in the study. At the 
beginning of each session, the hand sanitizer dispenses were placed in a “locked” position, which 
allowed the experimenter to easily and reliably determine which dispensers had been used, even 
if he or she did not directly observe their use. This behavioral coding provided the first 
dependent variable (coded 1 if participants used the hand sanitizer, and 0 if they did not). 
When five minutes had elapsed, a survey screen appeared instructing participants to (1) 
stop building, (2) place their model cars (and any unused pieces) in the sealable bag, and (3) 
“Follow any other instructions you may have received,” before notifying the experimenter. The 
                                                 
4 Pilot testing indicated that a five minute interval would be long enough to create variance in model-building 
performance, but short enough that no participants would complete the task entirely and have “down time.” During 
the study, however, five participants (4.3 percent) were able to fully assemble their model cars in the allotted time. 
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purpose of this final instruction was to provide participants a clear opportunity to follow the 
second instruction from the “Lab Health and Safety Guidelines” (i.e., using anti-bacterial 
cleaning wipes to clean the work trays in which they had assembled their model cars). Prior to 
each session, so that this behavior could also be indirectly observed, the experimenter opened 
each container of cleaning wipes and made a discrete mark on the first wipe to be dispensed. 
Thus, at the end of the session, the experimenter could also record which participants had used 
cleaning wipes, even if this behavior was not observed directly. This measure provided the 
second dependent variable, (coded 1 if participants used the cleaning wipes, and 0 if they did 
not).  
When participants notified the experimenter that they were ready to continue, the 
experimenter collected their model building materials, and instructed them to return to the 
survey. Although the model cars were re-used, they were never disassembled during study 
sessions, or in view of participants (as prior work has shown that doing so can adversely affect 
participants’ motivation and sense of meaning; Ariely, Kamenica, & Prelec, 2008). 
Participants first completed a second measure intended to reflect other-orientation vs. 
self-interest. In a sentence completion task (ostensibly evaluating redundancy in written 
language; Wegner & Guiliano, 1980), participants were asked to select one of three possible 
pronouns to complete each of five sentences. In all cases, the available options included one 
first-person singular pronoun (e.g., “I,” “my”), and two third-person pronouns (e.g., “she,” 
“their”). Selecting a first-person pronoun to complete a sentence indicated greater self-interest, 
while selecting a third-person pronoun indicated greater other-orientation. The number of first-
person pronouns chosen was summed to provide a quantitative measure (ranging in value from 0 
to 5). 
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 Next, participants completed two additional measures of ethical decision frame adoption. 
First, for each of the two safety performance standards communicated in the “Lab Health and 
Safety Guidelines,” participants were asked to categorize their decision making (following 
Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Specifically, the instructions read:  
During today’s study, you were asked to abide by lab health and safety guidelines. For 
each of these guidelines, you had to make a decision (i.e., whether or not to do what the 
instructions asked). For each of these decisions, please respond to the following question: 
If you had to choose one description for this decision, how would you describe it?   
Participants then categorized each decision as: an ethical decision, a business decision, a 
personal decision, a legal decision, or an environmental decision. Overall, 35.8 percent of 
participants categorized the decision to use hand sanitizer as an ethical decision, and 40.7 percent 
categorized using cleaning wipes as an ethical decision. These two responses were significantly 
correlated, r(121) = .45, p < .001.  
Participants were also asked to provide a continuous rating of the strength of their ethical 
frame for both decisions, with the same single-item measure used in Study 1 (“This decision 
involves ethical issues”). These responses were entered using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Responses for hand sanitizer use and cleaning wipe use were 
correlated, r(121) = .66, p < .001, as were ratings of ethical frame for the same safety 
performance decision compared across the two measures (.45 < rs < .60). 
After responding to these measures, participants reported some basic demographic 
information, after which they were debriefed and thanked. 
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Results 
 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all study variables are presented in 
Table 6. 
Manipulation Checks 
 Construal level. Participants’ responses to the “thought exercise worksheet” were coded 
by two independent judges, blind to the experimental condition. Judges rated the superordinate 
vs. subordinate focus of each participant response (following Fujia et al., 2006). Each participant 
provided four responses, and coders assigned a score of -1 to responses that were clearly 
subordinate to the original statement (i.e., “maintain good physical health”), a score of 1 to 
responses that were clearly superordinate, and a score of 0 if the response was unclear, or fit 
neither criterion. These scores were summed within participants to create an index with a 
potential range of -4 to +4. The computed average deviation (AD) value of .11 was below the 
relevant critical value (.73), indicating a statistically significant level of interrater agreement (p < 
.05; Smith-Crowe et al., 2014), and were averaged to form a single index. OLS regression 
revealed a significant main effect of construal level condition on this index, β = .97, t(121) = 
50.21, p < .001, as participants in the high-level construal conditions provided more 
superordinate responses (M = 3.57, SD = 0.79) than participants in the low-level construal 
conditions (M = -3.60, SD = 0.79). 
 Other-orientation vs. self-interest. The effectiveness of the other-orientation vs. self-
interest manipulation was assessed with four items developed for this study: “During today’s 
study, I…: “…was worried about others becoming sick,” “…was worried about becoming sick 
myself,” “…thought about how my actions might harm others,” “…thought about how I myself 
might be harmed.” Participants responded using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
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strongly agree). The two items reflecting other-orientation were correlated, r(121) = .66, p < 
.001, as were the two items reflecting self-interest, r(121) = .61, p < .001. These items were 
combined to form indices of other-orientation and self-interest, which were positively correlated, 
r(121) = .56, p < .001. Because of this result, the items were not combined to form a single index 
(i.e., consistent with a single, bipolar construct; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004), and were instead 
analyzed separately. The experimental manipulation of other-orientation vs. self-interest did not 
significantly predict the other-orientation index, β = -.15, t(121) = -1.68, p = .1, or the self-
interest index, β = -.01, t(121) = -0.10, p = .1. 
 The other-orientation vs. self-interest manipulation also did not predict the number of 
self-focused words identified in the word fragment completion task, β = -.12, t(121) = -1.28, p > 
.1, nor did it predict the number of first-person pronouns selected in the sentence completion 
task, β = .15, t(121) = 1.72, p = .09. While the latter effect was marginally significant, its 
direction suggests that participants selected more first-person pronouns (i.e., exhibited more self-
interest) in the other-orientation conditions.  
In short, either the manipulation of other-orientation was unsuccessful, or the measures 
used to assess this manipulation were flawed. Given that multiple measures of other-orientation 
were uncorrelated with the manipulation, and at least modestly correlated with one another, the 
former conclusion seems more likely. Possible interpretations of an unsuccessful manipulation 
are considered in the general discussion below. However, it was still possible to conduct tests of 
the model depicted in Figure 1 using these measures, using measured other-orientation vs. self-
concern. In all analyses, the level of the other-orientation vs. self-concern manipulation was 
included as a control variable. Unless otherwise indicated, the results reported were not 
substantively altered by including (vs. omitting) this control. 
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Hypothesis Tests 
 In total, 88 participants (71.5 percent) used the hand sanitizer as instructed, and 43 
participants (35.0 percent) used the anti-bacterial cleaning wipes as instructed. Binary logistic 
regression revealed no direct effect of construal level condition on safety performance. Construal 
level alone did not predict participants’ use of hand sanitizer, Exp[b] = -.29, z(121) = -0.71, p > 
.1, or of cleaning wipes, Exp[b] = .22, z(121) = 0.59, p > .1. 
 Following the analytical procedure used in Study 2, I first estimated separate models for 
the first and second stages of the moderated mediation model depicted in Figure 1. However, 
because Study 3 included one continuous measure of the hypothesized mediator (ethical decision 
frame), it was also possible to conduct holistic tests of the complete theoretical model. 
 First stage. The first stage of the model was analyzed hierarchically (see Tables 7 and 8). 
To test Hypothesis 1, I first estimated the models including only the main effect of construal 
level on various measures of ethical decision frame adoption. For the implicit (word-completion) 
measure of ethical decision frame adoption, OLS results showed a just-significant effect of 
construal level, β = .18, t(121) = 2.01, p = .05. Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 2, 
however, this effect was positive in direction, indicating that participants in the high-level 
construal conditions completed more ethics-related words. In evaluating participants’ decision to 
categorize safety performance as an ethical decision (vs. other decision type), logistic regression 
revealed no main effect of construal level on the categorization of hand sanitizer use as an ethical 
decision, Exp[b] = .09, z(121) = 0.25, p > .1, and a marginally significant main effect of 
construal level on the categorization of cleaning wipe use as an ethical decision, Exp[b] = .74, 
z(121) = 1.95, p = .05. Again contrary to prediction, this latter effect was positive in direction. In 
terms of the strength of participants’ ethical decision frames for the two dependent variables, 
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construal level did not significantly predict ethical frame strength for hand sanitizer use, β = .03, 
t(120) = 0.38, p > .1, or for cleaning wipe use, β = .15, t(120) = 1.64, p = .10, though this latter 
effect was close to significance (and, again, positive in direction). Thus, across multiple ethical 
decision frame operationalizations, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Possible interpretations of 
this finding are discussed below. 
 Next, I tested for moderation of the construal level-ethical decision frame path by other-
orientation (Hypothesis 3). To simplify the reporting of results, only results involving the 
implicit word fragment completion measure are described and interpreted here. Because this 
measure represented the number of self-focused words participants completed, higher values 
corresponded to lower levels of other-orientation. Because Hypothesis 3 is stated in terms of 
other-orientation, results are interpreted accordingly below. Results for the same set of analyses, 
instead using the sentence completion measure (i.e., selecting first- vs. third-person pronouns), 
are reported in Appendix 4.  
Hypothesis 3 was first tested using the implicit (word-completion) measure of ethical 
decision frame. Here, the construal level X other-orientation interaction was non-significant, β = 
-.03, t(120) = -0.20, p > .1.   
The next set of analyses focused on the dichotomous (i.e., categorization-based) measure 
of ethical decision frame. For the decision to use hand sanitizer, a significant construal level X 
other-orientation interaction predicted ethical decision frame adoption, Exp[b] = .95, z(119) = 
2.04, p = .04 (see Figure 4). Simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed a positive, 
marginally significant effect of construal level on ethical decision frame adoption when other-
orientation was low (-1 SD), Exp[b] = 1.12, SE = .65, p = .08, and a negative, but non-
significant, effect of construal level on ethical decision frame adoption when other-orientation 
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was high (+1 SD), Exp[b] = -.64, SE = .53, p > .1. These results suggest that when other-
orientation is high (and, corresponding, self-concern is low), lower levels of construal may 
increase the likelihood of adopting an ethical decision frame, as predicted by Hypothesis 3. 
When other-orientation is low, however, the effect of construal level on ethical decision frame 
adoption may instead become positive. For the decision to use cleaning wipes, however, the 
effect of the construal level X other-orientation interaction was not significant, Exp[b] = .25, 
z(119) = 0.60, p > .1. 
The final set of analyses involved the continuous measure of ethical decision frame 
strength. For the decision to use hand sanitizer, the construal level X other-orientation interaction 
was again a significant predictor of ethical decision frame strength, β = .36, t(118) = 2.09, p = 
.04 (see Figure 5). Simple slopes analysis also suggested a similar pattern, with a positive, 
marginally significant effect of construal level on ethical decision frame strength at lower levels 
of other-orientation (-1 SD), b = .82, SE = .47, p = .07, and a negative, but non-significant, effect 
of construal level at high levels of other-orientation (+1 SD), b = -.51, SE = .45, p > .1. As with 
the dichotomous measure of ethical decision frame adoption, these results provided partial 
support for Hypothesis 3. For the decision to use cleaning wipes, the effect of the construal X 
other-orientation interaction was not significant, β = .20, t(118) = .40, p > .1. To summarize, 
analyses concerning the specific decision to use hand sanitizer were largely supportive of 
Hypothesis 3, although the positive effect of construal level at low levels of other-orientation (or, 
high levels of self-interest) was not anticipated and warrants further exploration. Hypothesis 3 
was not supported by analyses concerning the decision to use cleaning wipes.  
 Second stage. Participants’ actual safety performance in the laboratory (i.e., whether or 
not they used the hand sanitizer and cleaning wipes as instructed) provided the two dependent 
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variables for Study 3. Hypothesis 1 predicted that ethical decision frame adoption will lead to 
greater safety performance. The implicit (word-completion) measure of ethical framing predicted 
neither hand sanitizer use, nor cleaning wipe use (ps > .1). However, categorization of hand 
sanitizer use as an ethical decision significantly predicted participants’ actual behavior, Exp[b] = 
1.05, z(121) = 2.22, p = .03, as did participant ratings of the extent to which hand sanitizer use 
was perceived as an ethical decision (i.e., decision frame strength), Exp[b] = .43, z(121) = 3.59, 
p < .001. Similarly, the categorization-based measure of ethical frame predicted the use of 
cleaning wipes, Exp[b] = .89, z(121) = 2.18, p = .03, as did the rating-based measure, Exp[b] = 
.40, z(121) = 3.00, p = .003. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported across both dependent variables, 
and both context-specific measures of ethical decision frame. Participants who perceived safety 
performance decisions as ethical decisions were more likely to behave safely. 
 Moderated mediation. The complete moderated mediation model was tested for both 
dependent variables, using the continuous measure of ethical decision frame strength as the 
mediator. Models were estimated using the PROCESS package for SPSS (see Table 9). The 
index of moderated mediation provides of formal test of whether the moderation of an indirect 
effect differs statistically from zero (Hayes, 2015). For the model in which hand sanitizer use 
was the dependent variable, the estimated value of the index of moderated mediation was .31, 
and the corresponding 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval (with 5,000 iterations) 
excluded zero (.02, .75). At the mean level of other-orientation, the indirect effect of construal 
level on safety performance was non-significant, b = .07, SE = .15, CI = (-.21, .38). When other-
orientation was low (-1 SD), the estimated indirect effect increased in magnitude, although the 
bootstrap confidence interval still included zero, b = .35, SE = .26, CI = (-.04, .94). When other-
orientation was high (+1 SD), the estimated indirect effect was negative, although its confidence 
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interval again included zero, b = -.22, SE = .20, CI (-.72, .13). Overall, these results provide 
some support for moderated mediation, and for the overall theoretical model depicted in Figure 
1. However, the positive effect of construal level at lower levels of other-orientation (i.e., higher 
levels of self-interest) was not hypothesized, and may account for the absence of a main effect of 
construal level on ethical decision frame adoption in these data (i.e., the unsupported Hypothesis 
2).  
 For the model in which cleaning wipe use was the dependent variable, the estimated 
index of moderated mediation was .17, and the associated confidence interval included zero (-
.10, .59). The indirect effect of construal level on safety performance via ethical decision frame 
was non-significant at the mean level of other-orientation, b = .23, SE = .16, CI (-.01, 65), and a 
high level (+1 SD) of other-orientation, b = .08, SE = .21, CI (-.32, .54). When other-orientation 
was low (-1 SD), the indirect effect of construal level was significant and positive, b = .39, SE = 
.25, CI (.02, .99). Thus, neither the pattern of indirect effects, nor the significance level of the 
omnibus test of moderated mediation, provided support for the hypothesized model. Possible 
interpretations of the differences in results between the two dependent variables are explored in 
the general discussion below. However, results for both dependent variables should be 
interpreted with some caution, as the number of participants enrolled in Study 3 may not provide 
adequate statistical power to detect small-to-moderate sized moderated mediation effects (Fritz 
& MacKinnon, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 10: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary  
Overall, the results of three empirical studies provided mixed support for the theoretical 
model developed above and depicted in Figure 1. In Study 1, a quasi-experimental survey study 
conducted in an organizational setting, lower levels of construal were associated with more 
ethical framing of safety-related decisions (supporting Hypothesis 2). In Study 2, an experiment 
involving a naturalistic simulation, no construal level-ethical decision frame main effect was 
detected, but this link was moderated by other-orientation for some ethical decision frame 
measures (Hypothesis 3). Ethical decision framing also led to increased safety performance 
(Hypothesis 1) though, again, only for some measures. Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 3 were partially 
supported, while Hypothesis 2 was unsupported. Study 3, a laboratory experiment, also revealed 
no main effect of construal level on ethical decision framing. However, this link was moderated 
by measured other-orientation for one of the dependent variables (though the form of the 
interaction differed somewhat from expectations), and multiple measures of ethical decision 
framing predicted safety performance. Lastly, moderated mediation (Hypothesis 4) was 
supported for one dependent variable. Thus, Hypothesis 1, 3, and 4 were partially supported, 
while Hypothesis 2 was again unsupported.  
Theoretical Implications 
 While further investigation is needed to reconcile the mixed empirical findings described 
above, several potential theoretical contributions merit discussion. In terms of workplace safety, 
three new factors (construal level, other-orientation, and ethical decision frames) are contributed 
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to the literature on the “proximal person” antecedents of safety performance. This application of 
ethical decision framing, in particular, may help to shed light on the “black box” of safety 
motivation. Given the fundamental of importance of harm-prevention in both ethics and safety, 
recognition of the ethical concerns inherent in safety performance may help to explain the 
drivers, or even meaning, of safety motivation. 
 Another potential contribution involves providing a new perspective on the relationship 
between construal level and ethical decision making. While some investigations have argued 
broadly for a positive relationship between construal level and ethical outcomes (e.g., Agerström 
& Björklund, 2009; Eyal et al., 2008; Tenbrunsel et al., 2010), others have found evidence of a 
negative relationship (Gong & Medin, 2012; Keeney & Hofmann, 2016). If the ethical domain is 
expanded to include prosocial outcomes (as proposed by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009), 
still more evidence speaks to the ethical benefits of lower level construal (e.g., Jones & Rachlin, 
2006; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Small & Simonsohn, 2008). Further complicating the picture, 
some recent investigations have shown that the construal level-ethical decision making 
relationship may be influenced by a variety of potential moderators, including cultural context 
(Gamliel, Kreiner, & McElroy, 2017), and the type of ethical consideration at stake (e.g., 
distributive vs. interactional justice; Cojuharenco et al., 2011). 
 This dissertation addresses the complexity of the construal level-ethical decision making 
relationship in three ways. First, I focus on the link between construal level and a specific, early, 
stage in the ethical decision making process (i.e., ethical decision frame adoption, which is 
roughly analogous to moral awareness; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Awareness that one 
is making an ethical decision is not sufficient to guarantee outcomes at more distal stages in the 
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process (i.e., intentions, behavior; Jones, 1991), so findings pertaining to one stage may not 
generalize to others.  
Second, this research follows other recent investigations (e.g., Cojuharenco et al., 2011; 
Gamliel et al., 2017) in proposing a novel boundary condition of the construal level-ethical 
decision frame link (other-orientation). This boundary condition might help to explain apparent 
discrepancies in the extant literature involving studies in which this variable was unmeasured. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, this investigation emphasizes the importance of context. In 
keeping with the logic of construal fit (Berson & Halevy, 2014), the level of construal most 
likely to promote an ethical outcome may simply be the one that best aligns with that particular 
decision context. The effect of construal level on ethical decision frame adoption I hypothesize 
and test is specific to the context of safety-related decisions. I identify contextual factors that 
make this particular setting distinct, but might also contribute to divergent findings in prior work, 
including: negative vs. positive goals (Dorner, 1989), prevention vs. promotion focus (Higgins, 
1997), and present- vs. future-focused dependent variables.  
 In terms of the behavioral ethics literature more broadly, this research responds to calls to 
use the decision frame construct as a means of better understanding ethical decision making 
processes (Kreps & Monin, 2011; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 
2008), by identifying a novel antecedent (construal level) and boundary condition (other-
orientation). Additionally, the current research represents one of the first investigations of ethical 
decision frames in an organizational setting (Study 1), and the first application in the context of 
safety. This research also responds to calls for the utilization of more novel dependent variables 
in ethics-related research, and for making the study of behavioral ethics more organizationally 
grounded (Brief & Smith-Crowe, 2016; Smith-Crowe & Zheng, 2016; Tenbrunsel & Smith-
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Crowe, 2008; Warren & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Considerable conceptual overlap exists between 
ethics and safety (i.e., harm prevention), and exploring that intersection may prove valuable to 
both fields. While the current research utilizes ethical decision making theories to predict safety 
outcomes, reciprocal efforts might be made to harness insights and interventions from the safety 
literature (e.g., safety climate) to influence ethics-related outcomes. 
 Lastly, this research makes a modest contribution to the ongoing debate concerning the 
nature of the relationship between other-orientation and self-interest. While some models 
conceptualize other-orientation and self-interest as endpoints of a single, bipolar continuum (e.g., 
the theory of other-orientation; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004, 2007), others argue they are better 
viewed as independent, orthogonal constructs (e.g., the self-concern and other-orientation as 
moderators hypothesis; De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). I argue that the relevance of this distinction 
may be context dependent—if an individual has finite resources to allocate between other- and 
self-focused concerns, it may indeed be appropriate to conceptualize the two in terms of a single, 
continuous measure. The results of Studies 2 and 3, however, are much more consistent with the 
view that other-orientation and self-interest are distinct constructs. In both studies, measures of 
other-orientation and self-interest were positively correlated, a result which is difficult to 
reconcile with the single-construct view. 
Practical Implications 
 Workplace safety is a particularly important area for organizational scholarship to target 
with practically-applicable findings. In 2015 alone, 4,836 U.S. employees were killed in 
workplace accidents, and another 4.8 million suffered injuries requiring medical attention. The 
estimated economic impact of these deaths and injuries was $206 billion (National Safety 
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Council, 2016). Yet, despite these risks, workers often choose not to follow safety performance 
standards (e.g., Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996). 
 The current research tackles a specific dilemma, which may help to shed new light on this 
disconnect. The ethical content of safety (i.e., harm prevention) suggests that workers perhaps 
should view safety performance as ethically obligatory. Ample evidence, from a variety of 
literatures, suggests that holding this view will have positive consequences for safety 
performance. However, the harm associated with safety performance will generally feel quite 
distal from the individual worker’s perspective (the macro-level statistics given above 
notwithstanding, accident base-rates tend to be quite low; Zohar, 2002). Because ethical 
judgment is sensitive to probability (Jones, 1991), the ethical content of safety performance may 
therefore be overlooked.  
 Construal level-based interventions offer a potential practical solution to this dilemma. 
Small variations in the content of messages can produce significant changes in employee 
mindsets and behaviors (Cialdini, 2003; Crum & Langer, 2007; Grant & Hofmann, 2011), and 
even common material symbols can play an important role in ethical decision making (Desai & 
Kouchaki, 2017). The story of the Iron Ring illustrates how a subtle cue, connected to a salient 
message, can make safety-related outcomes appear more concrete, more ethically-laden, and 
more motivating. This is not to suggest that encouraging employees to adopt lower levels of 
construal is a silver bullet. Prior work has revealed many organizational benefits to higher levels 
of employee construal (see Weisenfeld et al., 2017). Instead, the findings of this dissertation 
suggest that construal-lowering interventions might be targeted to specific, safety-critical times, 
locations, and situations, or to employees who might have greater need to “see the trees” (e.g., 
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older, more powerful, or more experienced employees, who may have higher trait levels of 
construal). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 As the mixed empirical findings illustrate, this research also involves a number of 
limitations that must be carefully considered. Inconsistent results between studies are a major 
source of concern. Hypothesis 2, which predicted a direct, negative effect of construal level on 
ethical decision frame adoption, was supported in Study 1, but not supported in Studies 2 and 3. 
One possible interpretation of the non-support revealed in Study 3 is that all conditions activated 
self-interest to some extent—the signage made reference to the possibility of catching the flu in 
all conditions, which might have overpowered the other-orientation manipulation. Given that low 
levels of other-orientation (or high levels of self-interest) are predicted to attenuate the 
relationship between construal level and ethical decision frame adoption, this could explain the 
lack of support for Hypothesis 2. The non-support of Hypothesis 2 in Study 2 is more 
concerning, because the study design included no plausible threat of harm to participants 
themselves. 
 Another possible interpretation for this inconsistency is that Studies 2 and 3 may have 
involved range restriction in terms of construal level, because they were conducted in the 
laboratory. The laboratory is an inherently artificial setting, which might restrict participants’ 
ability to become “lost in the trees.” While the experienced offshore drilling workers who took 
part in Study 1 might realistically focus on the minutiae of task performance at the expense of 
higher-level concerns, the novelty of the tasks involved in Studies 2 and 3 might have prevented 
participants from doing the same. 
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 One additional possibility is that the outcome variables in Studies 1-3 may not be readily 
comparable. In Study 1, I assessed participants’ framing of actual safety standards established by 
their real-world employer. In Study 2, I instead measured participants’ resource allocations to 
safety in an unfamiliar—and hypothetical—simulation. In Study 3, I observed participants’ self- 
and other-focused hygiene behaviors. In the domain of behavioral ethics, the outcome variable 
under study has important implications (Smith-Crowe & Zhang, 2016), and different outcomes 
can create barriers to generalizability across studies. The dependent variables described above 
might differ in the degree to which they invoke self-interest, in the degree to which they are 
perceived to be obligatory (vs. discretionary), and in their naturalism. Future investigations 
should attempt to establish generalizability by using more similar dependent variable 
operationalizations across studies. 
A second significant empirical concern is the lack of convergence between measures 
intended to operationalize the same construct in Studies 2 and 3. In particular, measures of both 
ethical decision framing and other-orientation were weakly, or non-significantly, correlated with 
one another in both studies. Non-significant results involving the implicit word-completion 
measure may be relatively straightforward to explain. The theoretical arguments in this 
dissertation are grounded in the context of safety-related decisions, and the other measures 
included in Studies 2 and 3 share that grounding (e.g., categorizing a specific decision as an 
ethical decision or some other type). The word completion measure, in contrast, measures the 
general accessibility of ethics-related concepts (Shu et al., 2011), and may therefore be more 
comparable to the general moral disengagement measure included in Study 1 (which was also 
unrelated to construal level). Several other discrepancies are more difficult to reconcile, and 
suggest greater caution in interpreting results, including: cases in which the same measures led to 
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different results across studies (e.g., the explicit measures of ethical decision framing in Study 2 
vs. Study 3), and cases in which different measures of the same construct led to different results 
within the same study (e.g., the implicit word- and sentence-completion measures of other-
orientation in Study 3). Because ethical decision frame adoption was the only mediator 
hypothesized and tested in this research, identifying and measuring other potential mediators 
might shed new light on these results.  
In Study 3, two additional empirical concerns were raised. First, the experimental 
manipulation of other-orientation vs. self-interest was unsuccessful. One possible explanation is 
given above (i.e., self-interest may have been salient in all conditions), but this does not fully 
explain the complete lack of effect on the manipulation check, or on the other, previously-
validated, measures of other-orientation included in the study. Secondly, the results of Study 3 
differed significantly across dependent variables. While several hypotheses were supported when 
analyzing the hand sanitizer use dependent variable, those results did not replicate with the 
cleaning wipe use dependent variable. One possible interpretation is simply that the “Lab Health 
and Safety Guidelines” were more salient at the time that hand sanitizer use was observed. This 
occurred shortly after participants were first exposed to the manipulation and read the study 
instructions. In contrast, the opportunity to use cleaning wipes arose after participants spent 
several minutes assembling a model car, which may have provided a significant distraction. 
Also, while hand-sanitizer use could be interpreted as preventing either personal or interpersonal 
harm, it is difficult to imagine personal harm arising from failure to use the cleaning wipes. 
 The results of Study 3 suggest broader questions about the generalizability of this work. 
While the research participants in Studies 1 and 2 were drawn from very different populations, 
the context of the studies themselves was fairly similar. Safety is generally very salient in the 
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offshore drilling industry, and is also made quite salient by the Deepwater simulation. Although 
Study 3 did introduce a different context, the salience of health and safety issues was still 
conveyed through both laboratory signage and experimenter instructions. Could the theoretical 
model developed in this dissertation generalize to contexts in which safety is less salient? On the 
one hand, the theoretical arguments presented here in terms of safety-related decisions might 
extend to risk-related decisions (which still convey the possibility of harm) more broadly, 
suggesting applicability to wider range of organizational contexts (e.g., financial services). On 
the other hand, if workers lack awareness that they are even making a safety- or risk-related 
decision (e.g., in organizations with weak risk- or safety-cultures, or environments in which 
adverse safety outcomes are genuinely not plausible), the construal level-based arguments 
advanced in this dissertation may not be applicable. This seems to suggest some initial awareness 
that one is in a safety- or risk-relevant setting is a necessary antecedent of the effects described in 
this paper. 
 Another unanticipated result is the finding, in Studies 2 and 3, that higher levels of 
construal may promote ethical decision frame adoption, and therefore safety performance, 
among individuals low in other-orientation (or high in self-concern). This finding indicates that, 
while this dissertation provides some novel insights into the relationship between construal level 
and ethical decision making, it falls short of fulling explaining this puzzle. One potentially 
promising future direction is to distinguish between types of ethical decision making. While 
contemporary theories suggest that ethical decision making is primarily intuitive (e.g., Gray, 
Young, & Waytz, 2012; Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006); deliberative, or rational, processes likely 
still play a role in some cases. The dual-process model of moral judgment (Greene, Nystrom, 
Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; 
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Greene, 2007) proposes that intuitive processes are operative in deontological, or rule-based, 
ethical decision making, and are activated by relatively strong contextual cues (e.g., salient harm 
to others). When such cues are weaker or altogether absent, however, people may instead engage 
in consequentialist, or outcome-based, ethical decision making, which involves more deliberative 
reasoning. For people low in other-orientation, situational cues indicating potential harm to 
others will be less salient and motivating. Such individuals might be better equipped to recognize 
the ethical content of their decisions through more deliberative, consequentialist reasoning. 
Indeed, one prior investigation has explicitly linked lower levels of constural to more 
deontological ethical decision making (Amit & Greene, 2012).  
A particularly important future direction for this research is to test the complete 
theoretical model in an organizational context. Study 1 provides some evidence for the 
generalizability of this work to organizational settings, but lacks a behavioral outcome of ethical 
decision frame adoption, and does not take the moderating role of other-orientation into account. 
Moreover, an organizational test of this model would allow it to be better integrated with existing 
models of workplace safety, by also incorporating effects of organizational (e.g., safety climate) 
and personal (e.g., conscientiousness) factors that have been shown to predict safety performance 
and motivation in prior research. Future field research should also test for potential differences 
between facets of safety performance (e.g., safety compliance vs. safety participation). While 
meta-analytic evidence suggests that safety compliance and participation tend to be strongly 
correlated, and responsive to similar antecedents (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006a), the 
arguments advanced in this dissertation might prove particularly relevant to safety participation, 
due to its discretionary and other-focused nature. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
Variable N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
        
 
 
   1. Construal level manipulation 74 0.50 0.50 --      
  2. Manipulation check (1st)  74 4.13 1.84  0.29* (.62)     
  3. Manipulation check (2nd) 74 4.01 2.73  0.90**  0.27* --   
  4. Ethical decision frame 74 6.22 1.35 -0.25*  0.11 -0.28** (.98)  
  5. Moral disengagement 74 2.17 1.04  0.00 -0.23*  0.01 -0.30** (.86) 
  6. Age 74 37.92 7.94  0.09  0.13  0.04  0.17 -0.22 
  7. Job tenure 74 4.83 4.11  0.04  0.09  0.03  0.05 -0.04 
  8. Industry tenure 74 12.94 8.05  0.12  0.08  0.06  0.07 -0.07 
  9. Organizational tenure 74 15.42 8.60  0.09 0.12  0.03  0.16 -0.16 
 
 
(Table 1 continued) 
Variable 6 7 8 
      6. Age  --   
  7. Job tenure  0.51**  --  
  8. Industry tenure  0.66**  0.40**  -- 
  9. Organizational tenure  0.89**  0.53**  0.80** 
 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 
Construal level manipulation: 0=low-level; 1=high-level 
Scale reliabilities (Cronbach’s Alpha) reported on the diagonal. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Study 1: Model Results for Ethical Decision Frame and Moral Disengagement, Regressed 
on Construal Level Manipulation  
 
 
 Ethical Decision Frame Moral Disengagement 
Variable      B SE    t      B SE      t 
Constant 6.48 0.27  24.1**  1.98 0.21   9.35** 
Construal level -0.68 0.31 -2.21* 0.01 0.24   0.03 
Time pressurea 0.15 0.31  0.49 0.37 0.24   1.52 
 
N = 74. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported.  
aTime pressure manipulation included as control variable. 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 
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TABLE 3 
 
Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among All Measured Variables  
 
 
Variable N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
        
 
 
   1. Construal level manipulation 79 0.53 0.50 --      
  2. Manipulation check 79 4.53 2.00  0.24* --     
  3. Psychological distance 79 3.61 1.32 -0.01  0.18 (.92)   
  4. Safety spending (Rd. 1) 79 2.65M 3.46M -0.27*  0.14  0.11 --  
  5. Safety spending (Total) 79 12.8M 12.5M -0.19  0.24*  0.07  0.78** -- 
  6. Ethical frame (coded) 79 0.16 0.37 -0.13  0.35**  0.14  0.39**  0.40** 
  7. Ethical frame (implicit) 79 0.21 0.25 -0.07  0.09  0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
  8. Ethical frame (explicit, categ.) 79 0.51 0.50 -0.06  0.09  0.02  0.05  0.10 
  9. Ethical frame (explicit, cont.) 79 6.00 1.34  0.00  0.18  0.33**  0.00  0.09 
10. Other-orientation 79 3.63 
 
1.76  0.00  0.26*  0.35**  0.29*  0.37** 
11. Self-interest 79 4.64 1.86 -0.15 -0.07  0.22  0.13  0.19 
 
 
(Table 3 continued) 
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 
        6. Ethical frame (coded)  --     
  7. Ethical frame (implicit)  0.09  --    
  8. Ethical frame (explicit, categ.)  0.03 -0.06  --   
  9. Ethical frame (explicit, cont.)  0.15  0.04  0.32**  --  
10. Other-orientation  0.33**  0.04  0.29**  0.51**  -- 
11. Self-interest  0.18  0.03 -0.18 -0.11  0.17 
 
N = 79 
Construal level manipulation: 0=low-level; 1=high-level 
Scale reliabilities (Cronbach’s Alpha) reported on the diagonal. 
† p < .10,  *p < .05,  **p < .01 
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TABLE 4 
 
Study 2: First Stage Logistic Regression Results for Ethical Decision Frame Adoption, 
Regressed on Construal Level and Other-Orientation 
  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable      Exp[b] SE    z      Exp[b] SE      z 
Constant -6.37 2.73 -2.34*  -34.2 13.7  -2.50* 
Construal level -0.90 0.85 -1.06 33.6 14.9  -2.25* 
Other-orientation 1.13 0.41  2.78** 6.20 2.46   2.52* 
Construal * Other-orientation    -5.86 2.48  -2.36* 
 
N = 79. Binary logistic regression coefficients are reported.  
Construal level: 0=low-level; 1=high-level 
Study session week and day included as controls, but not reported here. 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 
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TABLE 5  
 
Study 2: Second Stage Model Results for Safety Spending (Round 1 and Overall) Regressed 
on Ethical Decision Frame Adoption 
 
 
 Safety Spending (Rd. 1) Safety Spending (Total) 
Variable      B SE    t      B SE      t 
Constant 3.78 1.42  2.67**  16.3 5.06   3.21** 
Ethical decision frame 3.67 0.99  3.67** 14.1 3.57   3.94** 
 
N = 79. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported.  
Construal level: 0=low-level; 1=high-level 
Study session week and day included as controls, but not reported here. 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 
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TABLE 6 
 
Study 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among All Measured Variables 
 
  
Variable N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
        
 
 
   1. Construal level 123 0.49 0.50 
 
 --     
  2. Other-orientation a 123 0.49 0.50 -0.07  --    
  3. Construal level (manip. check) 123   -0.11 3.68  0.98** -0.08  --   
  4. Other-orientation (manip. check) 123 2.39 1.56  0.06 -0.15  0.03  --  
  5. Self-interest 123 2.00 1.36  0.18 -0.01  0.16  0.56**  -- 
  6. Hand sanitizer use 123 0.72 0.45 -0.07  0.07 -0.07  0.13  0.09 
  7. Wipes use 123 0.35 0.48  0.07 -0.23**  0.07  0.04 -0.02 
  8. Hand sanitizer ethical (categ.) 123 2.20 1.23 -0.17  0.16 -0.18* -0.04 -0.10 
  9. Wipes ethical (categ.) 123 2.47 1.22  0.08 -0.04  0.04  0.00 -0.09 
10. Hand sanitizer ethical (cont.) 123 4.56 1.77  0.04 -0.08  0.02  0.28**  0.09 
11. Wipes ethical (cont.) 123 4.40 1.77  0.16 -0.16  0.14  0.19*  0.02 
12. Ethical frame (implicit) 123 0.62 0.72  0.18* -0.12  0.18 -0.09 -0.11 
13. Other-orientation (word-comp.) 123 1.17 0.93  0.03 -0.07  0.04 -0.10 -0.11 
14. Other-orientation (sentences) 123 2.54 1.25  0.01  0.15  0.02  0.02 -0.07 
 
 
(Table 6 continued) 
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
        
 
 
   6. Hand sanitizer use --        
  7. Wipes use  0.27**  --       
  8. Hand sanitizer ethical (categ.)  0.23**  0.06  --      
  9. Wipes ethical (categ.)  0.11  0.23**  0.45**   --     
10. Hand sanitizer ethical (cont.)  0.33**  0.26**  0.22*   0.16  --    
11. Wipes ethical (cont.)  0.23**  0.30**  0.19*   0.30**  0.66**  --   
12. Ethical frame (implicit) -0.11  0.03  0.16   0.09 -0.02  0.02  --  
13. Other-orientation (word-comp.) -0.02  0.03  0.02   0.00 -0.14 -0.00 -0.02  -- 
14. Other-orientation (sentences)  0.07  0.12  0.04   0.00  0.12  0.07  0.00  0.04 
 
N=123 
a Unsuccessful manipulation (included as control) 
Construal level: 0=low-level condition; 2=high-level condition 
Hand sanitizer use/wipes use: 0=no; 2=yes 
† p < .10,  *p < .05,  **p < .01  
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TABLE 7 
 
Study 3: First Stage Logistic Regression Results for Ethical Decision Frame Adoption 
(Categorical Measure), Regressed on Construal Level and Other-Orientation 
 
 
Hand sanitizer dependent variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable      Exp[b] SE    z      Exp[b] SE      z 
Constant          -0.08 0.35 -0.22  0.45 0.44   1.02 
Construal level           0.10 0.39  0.27 -0.87 0.61  -1.42 
Other-orientation a          -0.51 0.22 -2.30* -1.05 0.37  -2.84** 
Construal * Other-orientation    0.94 0.44   2.03* 
 
 
Cleaning wipes dependent variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable      Exp[b] SE    z      Exp[b] SE      z 
Constant -0.73 0.35 -2.05*  -0.57 0.43  -1.32 
Construal level 0.77 0.37  2.05* 0.48 0.60   0.81 
Other-orientation a -0.03 0.21 -0.17 -0.17 0.31  -0.56 
Construal * Other-orientation    -0.57 0.43  -1.32 
 
N = 123.  
Binary logistic regression coefficients are reported.  
Construal level: 0=low-level; 1=high-level 
a Coded such that higher values indicate lower other-orientation 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 
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TABLE 8 
 
Study 3: First Stage OLS Regression Results for Ethical Decision Frame Strength (Rating-
Scale Measure), Regressed on Construal Level and Other-Orientation 
 
 
Hand sanitizer dependent variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable        B SE    t        B SE      t 
Constant          4.81 0.30 16.16** 5.24 0.36   14.62** 
Construal level          0.16 0.32  0.49 -0.68 0.51  -1.33 
Other-orientation          -0.28 0.17 -1.60 -0.65 0.25  -2.64* 
Construal * Other-orientation    0.71 0.34   2.09* 
 
 
Cleaning wipes dependent variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable           B SE    t         B SE      t 
Constant 4.14 0.30 13.95** 4.38 0.36 12.11** 
Construal level 0.56 0.32  1.75 0.09 0.51   0.17 
Other-orientation -0.01 0.17 -0.07 -0.22 0.25  -0.90 
Construal * Other-orientation    0.40 0.34   1.16 
 
N = 123.  
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported.  
Construal level: 0=low-level; 1=high-level 
a Coded such that higher values indicate lower other-orientation 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 
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TABLE 9  
 
Study 3: Indirect Effect (via Ethical Decision Framing) on Safety Performance Conditional 
on Other-Orientation. 
 
 
Hand sanitizer dependent variable 
   95% CI 
Variable Indirect Effect LL UL 
Construal level (-1 SD Other-orientation)  .35 -0.04 0.94 
Construal level (Mean Other-orientation)  .07 -0.21 0.38 
Construal level (+1 SD Other-orientation) -.22 -0.72 0.13 
 
Cleaning wipes dependent variable 
   95% CI 
Variable Indirect Effect LL UL 
Construal level (-1 SD Other-orientation)  .39  0.02 0.9i 
Construal level (Mean Other-orientation)  .23 -0.01 0.65 
Construal level (+1 SD Other-orientation) .08 -0.32 0.54 
 
N = 123.  
CI = 95% confidence interval computed using bias corrected percentile method; LL = lower limit; UL= upper 
limit.  
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size 5,000. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Complete Theoretical Model 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Study 1: Ethical Decision Frame by Manipulated Construal Level 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Ethical decision frame by manipulated construal level (Study 1). 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Study 2: Predictive Margins for Ethical Decision Frame Adoption (Dichotomous Outcome) 
by Construal Level Condition and Other-Orientation (+/- 1 Standard Deviation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
FIGURE 4 
 
Study 3: Ethical Decision Frame Adoption (Categorical Measure) by Construal Level and 
Other-Orientation (OO) 
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FIGURE 5 
 
Study 3: Ethical Decision Frame Strength (Continuous Measure) by Construal Level and 
Other-Orientation (OO) 
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APPENDIX A. MATERIALS FOR STUDY 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in our study today. We are interested in your perspective on 
workplace safety, as well as some of your thoughts and attitudes about your workplace more 
generally. When you are ready, please click the button below to begin work on the survey. This 
should take you no more than 15 minutes to complete. 
 
Thank you for your time! 
  
 
High-Level Construal Manipulation, Part 1 
 
 
Please describe 2-3 things you notice in this photo of the America. 
 
THEN 
 
Please describe 2-3 things you notice in this photo of the BlackHawk. 
 
THEN 
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Please describe 2-3 things you notice in this photo of the Confidence. 
 
 
High-Level Construal Manipulation, Part 2 
 
{Preceding photos are all displayed on screen} 
 
Now, have a look at these photos again. Then, please respond to the prompt below: 
 
Please provide 3-4 thoughts as to why employees might make safety in the workplace a priority. 
 
 
Low-Level Construal Manipulation, Part 1 
 
 
Please describe 2-3 things you notice in this photo of the doghouse. 
 
THEN 
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Please describe 2-3 things you notice in this photo of the drill floor. 
 
THEN 
 
Please describe 2-3 things you notice in this photo of the mud mix area. 
 
 
Low-Level Construal Manipulation, Part 2 
 
{Preceding photos are all displayed on screen} 
 
Now, have a look at these photos again. Then, please respond to the prompt below: 
 
Please provide 3-4 thoughts as to how employees might make safety in the workplace a priority. 
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Ethical Decision Frame 
 
{Response scale: 1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree} 
 
Some, but not all, of the choices people make at work involve ethical issues. We are interested in 
the extent to which you think each of the following choices involve ethical issues. For each item, 
please indicate your level of agreement with the statement: 
 
“This choice involves ethical issues.” 
 
1. Wearing appropriate PPE (safety glasses, hard hat, etc.) 
2. Making sure others are wearing appropriate PPE 
3. Using fall protection if working at height 
4. Using the type of gloves specified by the JSA (vs. using whatever gloves you have handy) 
5. Using push sticks when dealing with suspended loads 
6. Conducting/participating in after action reviews 
7. Following every step of the JSA 
8. Keeping equipment inspections current 
9. Maintaining a clean and organized work station 
10. Making proactive suggestions about how to make work safer 
 
 
Moral disengagement 
 
{Response scale: 1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree} 
 
The following items deal with your attitudes more generally. Please indicate your level of 
agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements: 
 
1. It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about. 
2. Taking something without the owner’s permission is okay as long as you’re just borrowing it. 
3. Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it’s hardly a sin to inflate your 
own credentials a bit. 
4. People shouldn’t be held accountable for doing questionable things when they were just doing 
what an authority figure told them to do. 
5. People can’t be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are 
doing it too. 
6. Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal. 
7. Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt. 
8. People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves. 
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Demographics 
 
Please answer the questions below: 
 
What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
How old are you (in years)? 
 
What is your highest level of education completed? 
1. Did not complete high school 
2. High school/GED 
3. Some college 
4. Vocational/technical degree 
5. Bachelor’s degree 
6. Advanced degree 
 
What is your current position title? 
 
How long have you held this position (in years)? 
 
How long have you worked for [organization] (in years)? 
 
How long have you worked in the offshore industry (in years)? 
 
You have reached the end of the survey. Thank you again for your participation! 
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APPENDIX B. MATERIALS FOR STUDY 2 
 
Laboratory Setup 
    
High-level construal condition         Low-level construal condition 
 
Introduction 
 
Please enter your User Name for the Deepwater Sim. 
 
 
Knowledge Quiz 
 
The following questions test your knowledge of the details of the simulation. If you answer any 
of these questions incorrectly, you will receive an error message from the survey software until 
you correct your response. 
 
If you need help answering any of these questions, or are unclear on any of the simulation 
details, please ask the experimenter for help. 
 
1. Which of the following factors does not affect your risk of a blowout? 
 a. Condition of the blowout preventer 
 b. Operating condition of the rig and its equipment 
 c. Weather 
 d. Amount of oil produced 
 e. Number of workers employed 
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2. Which of the following factors does not affect your profitability each round? 
 a. Amount of oil produced 
 b. Amount spent on safety programs 
 c. Choice of pollution control equipment 
 d. Price of oil 
 e. All of these affect your profitability 
 
3. What is the recommended minimum amount to spend on rig maintenance? 
 a. $5/bbl 
 b. $6/bbl 
 c. $8/bbl 
 d. $12/bbl 
 e. $50/bbl 
 
4. What is the recommended minimum amount to spend on safety programs (per round)? 
 a. $0.2 million 
 b. $1.0 million 
 c. $1.2 million 
 d. $2.0 million 
 e. $2.2 million 
 
5. What is the recommended maximum number of hours per worker? 
 a. 40 hours 
 b. 52 hours 
 c. 58 hours 
 d. 65 hours 
 e. 98 hours 
 
6. For maximum safety, what percentage of workers is recommended to receive off-rig training 
during the simulation? 
 a. 10 percent 
 b. 20 percent 
 c. 30 percent 
 d. 50 percent 
 e. 100 percent 
 
7. Which of the following does not directly reduce the likelihood of accidents and injuries during 
the simulation? 
 a. Firing workers 
 b. Spending more on safety programs 
 c. Reducing production 
 d. Training workers 
 e. Reducing the number of hours per worker 
 
Thank you! You may now review your Participant Handbook and other materials until the 
simulation begins. 
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Deepwater Simulation Decision Entry Screen 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision Making Room Survey 
 
Welcome to the Decision Making Room! Around your workstation you will see photographs of 
offshore drilling vessels like the one you’ll be managing in today’s simulation. 
 
Please take a moment to look at these photos. 
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Schedule 
 
You will now begin work on the competitive rounds of the simulation. There will be six rounds 
in total. The schedule for those rounds is below. 
  
Round 1 Deadline: 6:55pm 
Round 2 Deadline: 7:10pm 
Round 3 Deadline: 7:25pm 
Round 4 Deadline: 7:45pm 
Round 5 Deadline: 8:00pm 
Round 6 Deadline: 8:15pm   
The experimenter will notify you when you have two minutes left in each round, at which point 
you should enter your decisions immediately, if you have not done so already. The experimenter 
will also notify you when each round is concluded. 
  
Before you enter your decisions for Round 1, you will be asked to respond to a few short survey 
items. At the conclusion of each round, you should review your rig's performance and the 
"Market Report," and then return to this survey.  
  
Please click the arrow below when you are ready to begin. 
 
 
Manipulation Check (pre-Round 1) 
 
Please spend 2-3 minutes writing about your strategy for the simulation. That is, what do you 
hope to accomplish? 
 
 
Behavioral Identification Form (Construal Level Manipulation Check) 
 
Any behavior can be identified in a variety of ways. For example, one person might describe a 
behavior as "typing a paper," while another might describe the behavior as "pressing keys." Yet 
another person might describe the behavior as "expressing thoughts."  
 
For each of the following items, you task is to select the identification that best describes the 
behavior for you. There are no right or wrong answers. For each pair, simply click on the 
description that you personally believe is more appropriate. 
 
1. Making a list 
 a. Getting organized 
 b. Writing things down 
 
2. Taking a test 
 a. Showing one’s knowledge 
 b. Answering questions 
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3. Reading 
 a. Gaining knowledge 
 b. Following lines of print 
 
4. Paying the rent 
 a. Maintaining a place to live 
 b. Writing a check 
 
5. Voting 
 a. Influencing the election 
 b. Marking a ballot 
 
6. Filling out a personality quiz 
 a. Revealing what you’re like 
 b. Answering questions 
7. Greeting someone 
 a. Showing friendliness 
 b. Saying hello 
 
 
Ethical Decision Frame/Self-Interest (Implicit Measure) 
 
Next, you’ll be completing a short word completion task. For each of the word fragments below, 
please fill in one letter per blank to form the first English word that comes to mind that would fit 
the fragment: 
 
1. p _ r _ 
2. _i_d 
3. m _ r _ _ 
4. v _ r t _ _ 
5. m _ n _ 
6. _ _ l f 
7. o _ _ e r 
8. a _ o _ e 
 
 
Diary Prompt (Round 2) 
 
At the end of each round, you will be asked to spend 2-3 minutes typing a short, informal journal 
post. You can use this space to reflect on your own decision making, or the simulation more 
generally. In short, please write whatever comes to mind as you think about the simulation thus 
far. Please do so now. 
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Diary Prompt (Round 3) 
 
At the end of each round, you will be asked to spend 2-3 minutes typing a short, informal journal 
post. You can use this space to reflect on your own decision making, or the simulation more 
generally. In short, please write whatever comes to mind as you think about the simulation thus 
far. Please do so now. 
 
 
Diary Prompt (Round 4) 
 
At the end of each round, you will be asked to spend 2-3 minutes typing a short, informal journal 
post. You can use this space to reflect on your own decision making, or the simulation more 
generally. In short, please write whatever comes to mind as you think about the simulation thus 
far. Please do so now. 
 
Psychological Distance (Explicit Measure) 
 
{Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements. 
 
When I think about the workers on my rig: 
 
1. It feels like they are located near me. 
2. It feels like they are physically close to me. 
3. It seems like they are located beside me. 
4. I am actively working with them at the moment. 
5. Most of what they are working on with me, we are doing currently. 
6. They and I are working together right now. 
7. It feels like I am similar to them. 
8. They seem to have the same point of view as me. 
9. Their perspectives on things are aligned with mine. 
 
 
Ethical Decision Frame (Explicit Measure) 
 
During each round of the simulation, you made several decisions. Please indicate which label 
best describes each of the following decisions: 
• A personal decision 
• A business decision 
• An ethical decision 
• An environmental decision 
• A legal decision 
 
1. Whether to operate, shut-in, or overhaul the blowout preventer. 
2. How much crude oil to produce. 
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3. How much to spend on maintenance. 
4. How much to spend on safety programs. 
5. Hiring rig workers. 
6. Firing rig workers. 
7. Training rig workers. 
8. Selecting pollution control equipment. 
 
 
Diary Prompt (Round 5) 
 
At the end of each round, you will be asked to spend 2-3 minutes typing a short, informal journal 
post. You can use this space to reflect on your own decision making, or the simulation more 
generally. In short, please write whatever comes to mind as you think about the simulation thus 
far. Please do so now. 
 
 
Diary Prompt (Round 6) 
 
At the end of each round, you will be asked to spend 2-3 minutes typing a short, informal journal 
post. You can use this space to reflect on your own decision making, or the simulation more 
generally. In short, please write whatever comes to mind as you think about the simulation thus 
far. Please do so now. 
 
 
Construal/Psychological Distance Manipulation Check 
 
For the next 2 minutes or so, we’d like to hear your reaction to the “decision making room,” in 
which you just completed the simulation. Please write whatever comes to mind. 
 
 
Ethical Decision Frame (Explicit, Continuous Measure) 
 
{Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements. 
 
This decision involves ethical issues. 
 
1. Whether to operate, shut-in, or overhaul the blowout preventer. 
2. How much crude oil to produce. 
3. How much to spend on maintenance. 
4. How much to spend on safety programs. 
5. Hiring rig workers. 
6. Firing rig workers. 
7. Training rig workers. 
8. Selecting pollution control equipment. 
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Other-Orientation/Self-Interest 
 
{Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree} 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements. 
 
1. During the simulation, I thought about how others might be harmed by my decisions. 
2. I was concerned with how my decisions might impact others’ well-being. 
3. During the simulation, I thought about how my decisions might harm me personally. 
4. It felt as though I might be harmed as a result of my decisions during the simulation. 
 
 
Demographics 
 
Almost done! Please respond to the following questions. 
 
What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
(open-ended) 
 
What is your age (in years)? 
 
What is your affiliation with [UNIVERSITY] 
1. Undergraduate student 
2. Graduate student 
3. Faculty 
4. Staff 
5. Former student 
6. Not affiliated 
7. Other ____________ 
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 
 
Debrief 
 
Again, please accept our sincere thanks for participating in today’s study. Please notify the 
experimenter that you have completed the survey, so that you can receive important debriefing 
information. 
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APPENDIX C. MATERIALS FOR STUDY 3 
 
Workstation Signage (High-Level Construal, Other-Orientation) 
Model Building Study 
Health & Safety Guidelines 
 
The weather may be getting warmer, but the flu is still going around campus. Because you’ll be 
working with your hands during this study, we ask that everyone do the following: 
 
1. When you are ready to build your model (i.e., after you complete the initial survey), 
please use the hand sanitizer on your desk to clean your hands.  
2. Once you have finished building your model and placed all pieces back in the bag, please 
use one of the cleaning wipes on your desk to clean your work tray. 
 
We don’t want YOU TO PASS the flu on to other participants, or to the research assistants 
running the study. Remember, the flu has a long incubation period, so even if you haven’t had 
any symptoms you could still make others sick. 
 
Symptoms of the flu include: 
• Aches in muscles and joints; 
• Pain or tiredness around eyes; 
• Weakness or extreme fatigue; 
• Warm, flushed skin; 
• Headache; 
• Fever; and/or 
• Sore throat and runny nose. 
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Workstation Signage (High-Level Construal, Self-Interest) 
Model Building Study 
Health & Safety Guidelines 
 
The weather may be getting warmer, but the flu is still going around campus. Because you’ll be 
working with your hands during this study, we ask that everyone do the following: 
 
1. When you are ready to build your model (i.e., after you complete the initial survey), 
please use the hand sanitizer on your desk to clean your hands.  
2. Once you have finished building your model and placed all pieces back in the bag, please 
use one of the cleaning wipes on your desk to clean your work tray. 
 
We don’t want YOU TO CATCH the flu from other participants, or the research assistants 
running the study. Remember, the flu has a long incubation period, so even if they aren’t 
showing any symptoms others could still make you sick. 
 
Symptoms of the flu include: 
• Aches in muscles and joints; 
• Pain or tiredness around eyes; 
• Weakness or extreme fatigue; 
• Warm, flushed skin; 
• Headache; 
• Fever; and/or 
• Sore throat and runny nose. 
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Workstation Signage (Low-Level Construal, Other-Orientation) 
Model Building Study 
Health & Safety Guidelines 
 
The weather may be getting warmer, but the flu is still going around campus. Because you’ll be 
working with your hands during this study, we ask that everyone do the following: 
 
1. When you are ready to build your model (i.e., after you complete the initial survey), 
please use the hand sanitizer on your desk to clean your hands.  
2. Once you have finished building your model and placed all pieces back in the bag, please 
use one of the cleaning wipes on your desk to clean your work tray. 
 
We don’t want YOU TO PASS the flu on to other participants, or to the research assistants 
running the study. Remember, the flu has a long incubation period, so even if you haven’t had 
any symptoms you could still make others sick. 
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Workstation Signage (Low-Level Construal, Self-Interest) 
Model Building Study 
Health & Safety Guidelines 
 
The weather may be getting warmer, but the flu is still going around campus. Because you’ll be 
working with your hands during this study, we ask that everyone do the following: 
 
1. When you are ready to build your model (i.e., after you complete the initial survey), 
please use the hand sanitizer on your desk to clean your hands.  
2. Once you have finished building your model and placed all pieces back in the bag, please 
use one of the cleaning wipes on your desk to clean your work tray. 
 
We don’t want YOU TO CATCH the flu from other participants, or the research assistants 
running the study. Remember, the flu has a long incubation period, so even if they aren’t 
showing any symptoms others could still make you sick. 
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Survey Introduction 
 
Thank you for participating in this study today. The study involves three components, and will 
take approximately 15 minutes to complete: 
1. You will complete a short initial survey. 
2. You will spend five (5) minutes working on a model building task. 
3. You will complete a short follow-up survey. 
 
IMPORTANT: Because you will be working with your hands in this study, and because flu 
season is still ongoing, it is important that you carefully read the study "Health & Safety 
Guidelines" attached to your computer before proceeding.  
 
[Self-interest conditions] We don't want others to make you sick! 
[Other-orientation conditions] We don't want you to make others sick! 
 
 
Experimenter’s Instructions (SPOKEN) 
 
You are now going to work on the second study in today’s session, in which you’ll be building a 
model. After you review the consent form, you can begin working through the survey. The 
instructions should be fairly self-explanatory, but please read them carefully. You should also 
review the lab safety guidelines attached to your computer tower. Whenever you reach the first 
screen with a stop sign, please read the instructions, then raise your hand and I’ll bring you your 
model. Let me know if you have any questions. Otherwise, you may begin. 
 
 
Construal Level Manipulation Instructions (High-Level Conditions) 
 
For every thing we do, there always is a reason why we do it. Moreover, we often can trace the 
causes of our behavior back to broad life-goals that we have. For example, you currently are 
reading the instructions for a survey. Why are you doing this? Perhaps to complete this study. 
Why complete this study? Perhaps to fulfill your course research requirement. Why fulfill the 
research requirement? Perhaps you want to earn a good grade. Why earn a good grade? Maybe 
because you want to complete a requirement for your degree, or earn academic accolades. And 
perhaps you wish to complete your degree, or earn academic accolades, because you feel that 
doing so can bring you success in life. 
 
Research suggests that engaging in thought exercises like that above, in which one thinks about 
how one's actions relate to one's ultimate goals, can improve people's life satisfaction. In this 
study, we are testing such a technique. This thought exercise is intended to focus your attention 
on why you do the things you do. For this thought exercise, please consider the following 
activity: 'health improvement.'  
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Construal Level Manipulation Instructions (Low-Level Conditions) 
 
For every thing we do, there always is a process of how we do it. Moreover, we often can follow 
our broad life-goals down to our very specific behaviors. For example, like most people, you 
probably hope to have success in life. How can you do this? Perhaps completing your degree, or 
earning academic accolades, can help. How can you do these things? Perhaps by earning a good 
grade in BUSI 405. How can you earn a good grade? By fulfilling the research requirement. How 
can you fulfill the research requirement? In some cases, such as today, you follow the survey 
instructions to complete a study.  
 
Research suggests that engaging in thought exercises like that above, in which one thinks about 
how one's ultimate life goals can be expressed through specific actions, can improve people's life 
satisfaction. In this study, we are testing such a technique. This thought exercise is intended to 
focus your attention on how you do the things you do. For this thought exercise, please consider 
the following activity: 'health improvement.'  
 
 
Construal Level Manipulation “Worksheet” (High-Level Conditions) 
 
Next, please fill in the boxes below (starting from the bottom) to include increasingly general 
reasons why you might pursue this activity. 
 
1. Why? ______________ 
2. Why? ______________ 
3. Why? ______________ 
4. Why? ______________ 
5. Improve and Maintain Health 
 
 
Construal Level Manipulation “Worksheet” (Low-Level Conditions) 
 
Next, please fill in the boxes below (starting from the top) to include, increasingly specifically, 
how you might pursue this activity. 
 
1. Improve and Maintain Health 
2. How? ______________ 
3. How? ______________ 
4. How? ______________ 
5. How? ______________ 
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Ethical Decision Frame (Implicit Measure) 
 
Next, you’ll be completing a short word completion task. For each of the word fragments below, 
please fill in one letter per blank to form the first English word that comes to mind that would fit 
the fragment: 
 
1. p _ r _ 
2. _ i _ d 
3. m _ r _ _ 
4. v _ r t _ _ 
5. m _ n _ 
6. _ _ l f 
7. o _ _ e r 
8. a _ o _ e 
 
 
On-screen Instructions 
 
You are now ready to begin the model building task! Please raise your hand, and the 
experimenter will bring you a tray with your model pieces and instructions. 
 
You will be building a small racecar. You should follow the instructions that begin on page 1. 
You will have 5 minutes to work on this task. You are unlikely to finish in this amount of time, 
but please work as quickly as you can. 
 
When you have received your materials from the experimenter, please click the arrow below and 
your time will begin. 
 
PARTICIPANT COMPLETES MODEL ASSEMBLY TASK 
 
 
On-screen Instructions 
 
Please STOP working on your model. Before you call the experimenter, please do the 
following: 
1. Place your model in the Ziploc bag. Do not disassemble what you have built. 
2. Place any spare pieces in the Ziploc bag. 
3. Place the instruction booklet in the Ziploc bag. 
4. Follow any other instructions you may have received from the experimenter. 
Once you have followed these instructions, raise your hand and the experimenter will come 
collect your model. After the experimenter collects your model, you may continue with the 
survey by clicking the arrow below. 
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Behavioral Identification Form (Construal Level Manipulation Check) 
 
Any behavior can be identified in a variety of ways. For example, one person might describe a 
behavior as "typing a paper," while another might describe the behavior as "pressing keys." Yet 
another person might describe the behavior as "expressing thoughts."  
 
For each of the following items, you task is to select the identification that best describes the 
behavior for you. There are no right or wrong answers. For each pair, simply click on the 
description that you personally believe is more appropriate. 
 
1. Making a list 
 a. Getting organized 
 b. Writing things down 
 
2. Taking a test 
 a. Showing one’s knowledge 
 b. Answering questions 
 
3. Reading 
 a. Gaining knowledge 
 b. Following lines of print 
 
 
4. Paying the rent 
 a. Maintaining a place to live 
 b. Writing a check 
 
5. Voting 
 a. Influencing the election 
 b. Marking a ballot 
 
6. Filling out a personality quiz 
 a. Revealing what you’re like 
 b. Answering questions 
 
7. Greeting someone 
 a. Showing friendliness 
 b. Saying hello 
 
 
Other-orientation vs. self-interest (implicit sentence completion measure) 
 
Some things people say are redundant, in that one or more words in a sentence can be guessed 
from the remainder of the sentence. We'd like for you to read each of the following sentences, 
each of which contains a blank, and choose the most appropriate word from among the 
alternatives listed for each blank. 
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The alternatives are all technically correct, but some alternatives may be more likely than others. 
Please work quickly, and select the first answer that comes to mind. 
 
1. After spreading fertilizer liberally over the flower bed, _____ watered the flowers. 
 a. I 
 b. she 
 c. we 
 
2. Although _____ personal library consists of only a few books, some of them are classics. 
 a. their 
 b. our 
 c. my 
 
3. Please don’t do this to ______, it is just not fair. 
 a. me 
 b. her 
 c. us 
 
4. At first it didn’t seem to make any difference, but by later that night the noise from the party 
was entirely too loud to allow ________ to sleep. 
 a. us 
 b. her 
 c. me 
 
5. It isn’t easy to get lost in this town, but somehow ______ managed it. 
 a. I 
 b. we 
 c. they 
 
 
Other-orientation vs. self-interest (explicit measure/manipulation check) 
 
{Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree} 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements. 
 
1. During today’s study, I thought about how my actions might harm others. 
2. During today’s study, I thought about how I myself might be harmed. 
3. During today’s study, I was worried about others becoming sick. 
4. During today’s study, I was worried about becoming sick myself. 
5. I am feeling sick right now [control] 
6. I am currently experiencing flu-like symptoms [control] 
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Ethical Decision Frame (Explicit, Categorical Measure) 
 
During today's study, you were asked to abide by lab health and safety guidelines. For each of 
these guidelines, you had to make a decision (i.e., whether or not to do what the instructions 
asked). Now, for each of those decisions, please respond to the following question: 
 
If you had to choose one description for this decision, how would you describe it? 
 
Using the hand sanitizer before building a model. 
1. A personal decision 
2. A business decision 
3. An ethical decision 
4. An environmental decision 
5. A legal decision 
 
Using a cleaning wipe to clean your work tray after building your model. 
1. A personal decision 
2. A business decision 
3. An ethical decision 
4. An environmental decision 
5. A legal decision 
 
 
Ethical Decision Frame (Explicit, Continuous Measure) 
 
{Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree} 
 
For each of the following decisions, please indicate your agreement with the following 
statement: 
 
This decision involves ethical issues 
 
1. Using the hand sanitizer before building your model. 
2. Using the cleaning wipe to clean your work tray after building the model. 
 
 
Self-Reported Rule Compliance 
 
{Response scale: 0 = no; 1 = yes} 
 
1. Did you use the hand sanitizer before building your model? 
2. Did you use a cleaning wipe to clean your work tray after building your model? 
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Demographics 
 
Almost done! Please respond to the following questions. 
 
What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
(open-ended) 
 
What is your age (in years)? 
 
What is your academic year? 
1. First year student 
2. Sophomore 
3. Junior 
4. Senior 
5. Graduate Student 
6. Other ____________ 
 
What is your major? 
 
Are you an international student? 
 
 If YES: From where? 
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 
 
Debrief 
 
Again, please accept our sincere thanks for participating in today’s study. Please notify the 
experimenter that you have completed the survey, so that you can receive important debriefing 
information. 
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